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VOLUME 3

NUMBER 2

PITFALLS IN DEVELOPING LANDS BURDENED BY
NON-PARTICIPATING ROYALTY: CALCULATING
THE ROYALTY SHARE AND COEXISTING WITH
THE DUTY OWED TO THE NON-PARTICIPATING
ROYALTY OWNER BY THE EXECUTIVE INTEREST ∗
[reprint, first published 1995]
PHILLIP E. NORVELL **
I. Introduction
Non-participating royalty may be severed 1 from the mineral estate, 2 and
when severed, only entitles the owner to its prescribed share of production,
∗ This article was originally published in the Arkansas Law Review. See Phillip E.
Norvell, Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty: Calculating
the Royalty Share and Coexisting with the Duty Owed to the Non-Participating Royalty
Owner by the Executive Interest, 48 ARK. L. REV. 933 (1995). The Journal would like to
thank Professor Norvell and the editorial staff of the Arkansas Law Review for their
permission to republish the article. For more information about the Arkansas Law Review,
visit http://media.law.uark.edu/arklawreview/.
** Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. A non-participating royalty interest may be created by grant or by reservation. To
facilitate this discussion, the terms will be used interchangeably.
2. A non-participating royalty interest may be for a fee, term or defeasible term. For a
discussion of term and defeasible term royalty interests, see Phillip E. Norvell, Defeasible
Term Mineral and Royalty Interests, 24TH ANNUAL ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
INSTITUTE (1985). Also, for an examination of the nonparticipating royalty deed form that
has been traditionally utilized in Arkansas, see Oliver M. Clegg, The Arkansas Royalty
Deed: Questions and Answers, 21ST ANNUAL ARKANSAS NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
INSTITUTE (1982).
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cost-free. The nonparticipating royalty owner does not participate in the
executive right, the right to execute oil and gas leases, or in bonus or delay
rental payments. 3 Oil and gas prospects burdened by non-participating
royalty interests present two initial issues that the operator contemplating
leasing and subsequent development should consider. As a preliminary
step, non-participating royalty conveyances must be interpreted to
determine the share of gross production that is conveyed. Central to
determining the share of gross production conveyed is the issue of whether
the interest created is a fractional share royalty or a fraction of royalty. This
article will discuss the difference between a non-participating fractional
share and a fraction of royalty and review the peculiar problems that beset
the interpretation of royalty conveyances when determining which of these
distinct interests has been created.
Additionally, this article also will discuss the standard of care that the
executive right holder owes to the non-participating royalty owner in
negotiating the lease royalty. Likewise, the basis for imposing liability on
an oil and gas lessee who secures an oil and gas lease from the executive
right holder who violates the duty of care owed to the nonparticipating
royalty owner will also be explored. The standard of care that the executive
right holder owes to the non-participating royalty owner in negotiating the
oil and gas lease may be an additional basis of liability for the oil and gas
lessee. Compensatory and exemplary damages, or lease cancellation, may
be incurred by the oil and gas lessee who negotiates the lease from a
culpable executive right holder.
II. The Difference Between The Fractional Share And The Fraction Of Nonparticipating Royalty
The difference between a non-participating fractional share royalty and
a fraction of royalty is simple, yet illusive. First, a fractional share royalty
entitles the owner to only that specified fractional quantum of gross
production stated in the deed. In essence, the effect of a fractional share
conveyance of royalty is to transfer “a fraction or percentage of gross
production that stands as a free royalty.” 4 The share of gross production that
the fractional share is entitled to is fixed by the fractional size of the
interest conveyed by the deed, regardless of the amount of royalty
3. Wynn v. Sklar, 493 S.W.2d 439 (Ark. 1970); Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359
(Ark. 1955); Arkansas Valley Royalty Co. v. Arkansas-Oklahoma Gas Co., 258 S.W.2d 51
(Ark. 1953).
4. 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 327.1 (1994).
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contained in a subsequent oil and gas lease. 5 For example, the language
conveying “an undivided 1/16th of all of the oil, gas, and other minerals
produced and saved,” entitles the royalty owner to a 1/16th share of gross
production regardless of the fact that the landowner’s royalty reserved in
the oil and gas lease is a 1/8th, 3/16th or 1/4th royalty. 6 A fractional share royalty interest does not participate in any overriding royalty reserved in an oil
and gas lease that may be in addition to the landowner’s royalty. 7
Conversely, a non-participating fraction of royalty conveys that
fractional share of royalty that is contained in the oil and gas lease.8 For
example, a 1/2 of non-participating royalty, with an oil and gas lease
providing for a 1/8th royalty, is entitled to a 1/16th part of gross production.
Likewise, if the oil and gas lease provides for a 3/16th of royalty, a 1/2 of nonparticipating royalty is entitled to 3/32nds of gross production. In effect, the
fraction of the non-participating royalty’s share of production is not “fixed”
but “floats” in accordance with the size of the landowner’s royalty contained in the lease. 9 In addition to the landowner’s royalty, the fraction of
non-participating royalty also shares proportionally in any overriding
royalty interest reserved in the oil and gas lease if the interest is a royalty. 10
Because the holder of the executive right negotiates the landowner’s royalty
share in the oil and gas lease and thus determines the share of royalty that
the fraction of non-participating royalty owner receives, the executive
owner owes a duty of care to the non-participating royalty owner in
establishing the landowner’s royalty.
The question of whether a non-participating royalty conveyance creates a
fractional share or a fraction of royalty presents an issue of construction
teeming with complications. The fact that the standard landowner’s royalty
in the oil and gas lease for approximately 50 years was a 1/8th share looms
large in the confusion. This customary 1/8th share furnished the background
in which non-participating royalty interests were created during that era.
Therefore, a person wanting to reserve a share of the landowner’s 1/8th
royalty, as for example 1/2 of that interest, could express it in either one of
two ways: the reservation could be expressed as a fraction of royalty, for
example 1/2 of the royalty, entitling the person to 1/16th share of gross
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Barret v. Kuhn, 572 S.W.2d 135 (Ark. 1978); Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855
(Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
8. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 327.2.
9. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 327.2.
10. See infra note 94.
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production, or the reservation could be expressed as a straight fractional
share, for example a 1/16th share of gross production, also entitling the
person to 1/16th share of gross production. Thus, for many years, as a
practical matter, a fractional share and a fraction of royalty were
synonymous. 11 In fact, as will be seen, many non-participating royalty
interests were created by instruments that utilized both a fractional share
and a fraction of royalty. One expression may be found in one clause of the
deed, such as the granting clause, while the alternative expression appears
in either a “subject to” or a “future leasing” clause.
Over the last twenty years the landowner’s royalty in the oil and gas
lease has increased to a greater fractional share, such as a 3/16th or 1/4th.
Consequently, a fractional share or a fraction of royalty are no longer
synonymous but instead yield different shares of gross production. The
fraction of designation, created during the era in which the 1/8th landowner’s
royalty was all but universal and was the background for the transaction,
yields a greater share of production than its historic counterpart, the
fractional share designation.
To further complicate matters, some laypersons had difficulty with
fractions in general, particularly during the old days when less of the
populace was educated. Moreover, the distinction between these two
different royalty designations is often slight, and some laypersons, as well
as lawyers, simply fail to comprehend the difference.
III. Delineating The Difference Between A Fractional Share And A
Fraction Of Royalty
The distinction between fractional share royalty interests and fraction of
royalty interests may best be illustrated by examples from case law. A
common example of a fractional share non-participating royalty is the grant
of a fraction of gross production or its equivalent. For example, “an
undivided 1/24th of all the oil, gas, and other minerals produced, saved and
made available for market” was held to convey a fractional share royalty
interest entitling the grantee to a 1/24th share of gross production. 12

11. Ernest E. Smith, Conveyancing Problems, State Bar of Texas Professional
Development Program: Advanced Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Course, at G-l (1981)
[hereinafter Smith 1],
12. Miller v. Speed, 248 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952). See also Hanson v. Ware,
274 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Ark. 1955), wherein the granting clause to a 1919 royalty deed
conveyed a “one-sixteenth part of all oil and gas produced and saved.”
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The fractional share conveyance may also utilize a fraction in reference
to “royalty” as a synonym for gross production. Thus, a reservation of “a
1
/16th royalty from any oil and gas produced” entitles the grantor to a 1/16th
share of gross production. 13 Similarly, a grant of “a fee royalty of 1/32 of the
oil and gas” was held to create a fractional share 1/32nd interest in gross
production. 14
Conversely, the common example of a fraction of nonparticipating
royalty is the grant of “1/2 of royalty.” 15 The share of gross production is the
specified fraction of the amount of the oil and gas lease royalty. As has long
been observed, the “fraction of royalty” designation is equivalent to a
mathematical formula that determines the quantum of gross production
involved. 16 The term “of” that follows the fraction (1/2) and precedes the
term “royalty” means “times” and requires the fraction to be multiplied by
the lease royalty to determine the quantum of gross production. Thus, when
the lease royalty is 1/8th, 1/2 of royalty equals 1/16th of gross production. Yet
that same fraction of royalty equals 3/32nds of gross production when the
lease royalty is 3/16ths.
A fraction of royalty has also been expressed by language that indicates
the fraction is an interest in the royalty. For example, a grant of a “one-half
(1/2) interest in all royalties” was held to convey “one-half (1/2) of the
royalty” reserved in the mining lease. 17 Also, a deed reserving “one-half
(1/2) interest in and to the royalty rights” was held to reserve 1/2 of the
13. Karaker v. Unknown Heirs, 434 P.2d 282 (Okla. 1966). In Karaker, the court was
construing a reservation in a 1922 deed. The sole issue was whether the reservation reserved
a 1/16th of gross production or only a 1/16th of a 1/8th royalty. The court found the reservation
ambiguous. Moreover, the court admitted into evidence a 1924 oil and gas lease that
provided that the lease royalty was to be divided one-half (1/2) equally between the grantor
and grantee of the deed. The court held that the reservation was to a 1/16th of gross
production as a non-participating royalty. In reaching this result, the court emphasized that
the reservation stated 1/16th royalty of any oil and gas produced, as opposed to 1/16 of any
royalty interest, noting that a distinction exists between the term “royalty” and “royalty
interest.”
14. Caraway v. Owens, 254 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953).
15. See Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), wherein dicta noted
that a grant of “one-fourth (1/4th) of the royalty” conveyed a “fraction of royalty” and the
ultimate share of production accruing to the interest was “determinable upon the execution
of some future lease.” Id. at 857. The grantee received 1/4th of the 1/8th lease royalty as well
as 1/4th of 1/16th of the 7/8th overriding royalty reserved in a subsequent oil and gas lease.
16. It is accepted convention “that ‘of’ is the same as ‘times’ in a multiplication
formula.” 6 W.D. Masterson, Jr., OIL & GAS REPORTER, at 1372 (1956) (discussing Minchen
v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956)).
17. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enter., Inc., 645 S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
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royalty to be paid under any existing or future lease.18 Similarly, a
reservation of “an equal one-eighth (1/8th) of any royalty of all oil . . . [or]
gas . . . developed on or received from said land” reserved a 1/8h of royalty,
which due to the royalty in the lease being 1/8th, reserved a 1/8th of 1/8th, or a
1
/64th, share of gross production. 19
IV. The Problem Areas
A. A Fraction of a 1/8th Royalty
Some non-participating royalty conveyances have utilized a fraction of a
/8th royalty to fix the quantum of the royalty share. The effect is to create a
fractional share royalty. For example, a grant of “1/2 of the 1/8th royalty
(same being 1/16th of total production)” conveys a 1/16th share of gross
production despite the fact that the lease royalty may be in excess of a 1/8th
share. 20 The plain meaning of the specific language utilized dictates the
fractional share construction. After all, 1/2 of 1/8th equals a 1/16th share. The
specific language of the grant or reservation precludes a construction of
anything other than a fractional share of gross production. Thus, the courts
give a literal interpretation to the fraction of 1/8th non-participating royalty
which results in a fractional share construction.
That result, however, has not gone unquestioned. Dean Ernest Smith has
observed that the general intent of the parties to the conveyance of a
fraction of a 1/8th royalty was to convey a fraction of whatever royalty share
was subsequently provided for in the lease.21
In essence, under Smith’s theory, the 1/8th fraction appearing in the
formula was not only synonymous with the oil and gas lease royalty share
but signified the lease royalty share, whatever that share subsequently
became. Thus, a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty would be construed as a 1/4th of royalty
or a fraction of royalty, entitling the royalty owner to share in lease royalty
in excess of 1/8th. The hypothesis for Smith’s general intent for a fraction of
royalty construction is the historical ubiquity of the oil and gas lease royalty
1

18. Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).
19. Nourse v. Kovacevich, 109 P.2d 999 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
20. Helms v. Guthrie, 573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978). In Helms, the grantee in
the deed sued to recover a 1/16th share of a 1/16th of 7/8ths overriding royalty interest that had
been reserved in the lease in addition to the 1/8th royalty share. In Texas, as noted in the case,
overriding royalty is royalty. The court held that Helms was only entitled to a 1/16th of gross
production. The court observed that Helms owned “a ‘fractional royalty’ of 1/16th of the total
production, not a ‘fraction of royalty,’ determinable upon the execution of some future
lease.” Id. at 857.
21. Smith I, supra note 11, at G-l.
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as a 1/8th share and the probability that the parties never considered the
possibility of a lease providing for a greater royalty share. Smith
recognizes, however, that the specificity as to the quantum of royalty
inherent in the fraction of 1/8th royalty conveyance, i.e., the specific intent,
precludes any contradiction of such terms by a general intent based on
historical facts or assumptions. 22 Thus, despite his qualms, Smith
recognizes that the fractional share construction will prevail as the fraction
of 1/8th royalty formula.
Nevertheless, cases exist which deal with deeds or reservations of a
fractional share of 1/8th royalty which bear the suspicion that Smith’s
general intent theory is not far off the mark. One such case is Canter v.
Lindsey 23 from the Texas Civil Court of Appeals. In that case, Dora Roberts
owned the fee mineral estate to 17,712 acres of land. In 1935, she conveyed
to M. C. Lindsey as follows:
ONE FOURTH OF ONE EIGHTH (1/4 of 1/8) of all the oil, gas,
and other minerals produced from the following described
land . . . the interest herein conveyed being an equal one fourth
of one eighth (1/4 of 1/8) part of all of the oil, gas, and other
minerals when same has been produced from said land, and to
such extent, such part of any and all future productions of such is
hereby conveyed. 24
The deed also reserved to the grantor the right to all bonuses, delay
rentals and executive rights.
Thereafter, in 1941, Roberts executed the following deed to J. E. Mabee:
That I, Dora Roberts, . . . do GRANT, SELL, and CONVEY
unto the said J. E. Mabee, . . . , a three-fourths (3/4) interest,
undivided, in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, on, in,
and under the certain tracts, parcels and pieces of land . . . . 25
The next clause of the deed conveyed to Mabee all the executive, bonus
and delay rental rights, “as well as all other benefits accruing thereunder,”
to the remaining 1/4th interest.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Smith I, supra note 11, at G-2.
575 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 333.
Id.
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That clause continued as follows:
save and except the royalty payable under any such lease
covering such 1/4th interest, all royalty accruing under any such
lease on such 1/4th interest being payable to M. C. Lindsey, his
heirs and assigns, who owns an undivided one-fourth (1/4) nonparticipating royalty interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in
said land . . . . 26
The deed then recited that Lindsey did not own any executive, bonus, or
rental rights, such rights having been retained by Roberts in Lindsey’s deed,
and repeated that such rights were conveyed to Mabee who would then
solely own all executive, bonus, and delay rental rights. As to royalty, the
instrument concluded by stating that Mabee would own:
the right to receive only three-fourths (3/4) of the royalty accruing
under any such lease, or leases, the remaining one-fourth (1/4)
interest in such royalty being owned by M. C. Lindsey, his heirs
and assigns. 27
In 1973, an oil and gas lease covering part of the land was executed that
provided for a 3/16ths royalty, and production was established on the lease.
A declaratory judgment action was then instituted to determine the
ownership of the 1/16th lease royalty share attributable to the 1/4th of royalty
interest reserved in the Mabee deed that was in excess of the 1/8th royalty
share. Predictably, all of the parties to the original conveyances were
deceased, but the heirs and successors-in-interest of Lindsey, Mabee, and
Roberts 28 sought to recover the 1/16th royalty share. 29
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. To facilitate the discussion, as in the appellate court opinion, the parties will be
referred to as the principals, Lindsey, Roberts, and Mabee, as opposed to their successors-ininterest.
29. To facilitate an understanding of the case, the calculation of the lease royalty shares
pursuant to the theories of the different claimants appears below.
Lindsey, the plaintiff, claimed a 1/4th of the 3/16th royalty, or 3/64th of gross production.
He recognized the defendant, Mabee, as owning 3/4th of 3/16th or 9/64ths of gross production
while Roberts, the intervenor, pursuant to Lindsey’s theory, was entitled to no royalty.
Mabee, the defendant, claimed he was entitled to all royalty reserved under any lease in
excess of 1/4th of 1/8th (1/32nd), with the ownership of the 3/16th lease royalty being as follows:
(1) Lindsey owning 1/4th of 1/8th to equal fend share of gross production and (2) Mabee
owning a full 3/16th minus Lindsey’s fend share, entitling Mabee to 10/64ths. Roberts, again,
was entitled to no royalty.
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Lindsey maintained that he acquired the excess 1/16th royalty share by
virtue of the 1935 deed. Lindsey argued, in part, that the deed conveyed a
1
/4th of 3/16th, equal to a 3/64th, royalty share in production from the 1973
lease. Lindsey prevailed at the trial court, but the Court of Appeals reversed. First, the court held the deed unambiguous and construed the scope
of the conveyance to encompass only a 1/32nd fractional share nonparticipating royalty. In effect, the court determined that the deed conveyed
to Lindsey a fractional share 1/32nd royalty, not a 1/4th fraction of royalty.
Thus, Lindsey was only entitled to a 1/32nd share of gross production
regardless of the size of the landowner’s royalty contained in the 1973
lease. The court observed:
The Plaintiff became entitled to a 1/32nd royalty interest, but no
more. That interest was established in 1935 and was absolute and
independent of any royalty reserved in any future lease by the
then holder of the executive rights.30
In effect, the court in Canter literally interpreted the 1/4th of 1/8th royalty
deed to convey a fractional share 1/32nd interest.
In addition to the 1935 deed, Lindsey also claimed that the recitals in the
1941 Mabee deed that described, albeit erroneously, his royalty share as a
1
/4th of royalty established his right to a 1/4th share of the 1973 lease royalty.
The court rejected this argument for the following reasons. First, the recitals
in the Mabee deed that described the royalty as a 1/4th share did not operate
to grant Lindsey that interest because the Mabee deed lacked words of
conveyance. Additionally, because the recitals in the Mabee deed were
erroneous as to Lindsey’s title, the recitals could not supply a basis for an
exception to the grant that would operate as a conveyance of an interest. 31
Finally, both of the Lindsey theories relating to the 1941 Mabee deed failed
because they contravened the rule that a reservation in favor of a stranger to
the title is void.
Mabee, the grantee to the 1941 deed, claimed the excess royalty at issue
on the theory that Roberts had conveyed to him everything which she
owned and had not previously conveyed to Lindsey. The court rejected this
argument noting that even though Roberts was mistaken as to Lindsey’s
Roberts, the intervenor, claimed 1/4th of any royalty in excess of 1/8th reserved on any
lease (1/4th of 1/16th, or 1/64th). She recognized that Lindsey was entitled to 1/32nd of gross
production and Mabee was entitled to 3/4ths of 3/16th or 9/64ths of gross production.
30. Canter, 575 S.W.2d at 335.
31. See Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957), which was cited in Canter, 575
S.W.2d at 335.
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interest under the 1935 deed, believing Lindsey owned a 1/4th of royalty
when he in fact owned a 1/32nd royalty, the 1943 deed clearly and
unambiguously reserved a 1/4th of the royalty from the conveyance to
Mabee. In effect, Roberts retained that portion of the reserved interest that
was not outstanding in another. 32 Thus, as only 1/32nd was outstanding in
Lindsey, entitling him to 2/64ths of the gross production, and Roberts had
reserved 1/4 of royalty in the conveyance to Mabee, being 1/4th of 3/16ths, or
3
/64ths, of such production, she owned the difference, being a 1/64th share of
gross production.
When Canter v. Lindsey is considered in relation to Dean Smith’s
general intent theory, one wonders if Dora Roberts believed that a 1/4th of
1
/8th royalty was identical to a 1/4th of royalty when she executed the two
deeds. The court admitted that Roberts was mistaken as to the effect of the
1935 deed when she executed the 1941 deed. Was she also mistaken in
believing that a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty was conveyed to Lindsey, as opposed to
a 1/4th of royalty? Or did she simply not believe that there was a distinction
between the two? Did she think that the different formulas were
synonymous and conveyed the equivalent share in production from a future
lease? Roberts, as well as Lindsey and Mabee, may have labored under that
delusion. In any event, no matter how convincing one might find Smith’s
theory, the literal interpretation that results from a fractional share
construction of a fraction of 1/8th royalty prevails, absent additional
language or circumstances that dictate a different result.33 The plain
32. The court noted that Roberts conveyed a 3/4th mineral interest to Mabee. As to the
remaining 1/4th mineral interest, Roberts conveyed to Mabee the executive right and the right
to bonus and delay rentals. Thus, Roberts owned the 1/4th mineral interest shorn of the
executive right, right to delay rentals, right to bonus, and a 1/8th of royalty. Note that despite
the fact that Roberts conveyed most of the incidents of ownership as to her 1/4th nonparticipating mineral estate, she would only share in any benefits of mineral ownership in
the event that the lease royalty was in excess of 1/8th.
33. In Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954), the court
construed a royalty deed that granted a 1/4th of non-participating royalty as conveying only a
1
/4th of 1/8th royalty. Following the legal description, the 1/4th of royalty deed contained a
clause referring to a prior deed “for all purposes.” The prior deed was the source of the
grantor’s title that reserved to the grantor only an “undivided 1/2 of 1/8th royalty.”
Subsequently, an oil and gas lease was executed providing for a variable royalty, a 1/4th
royalty that under certain circumstances would increase to a 7/16ths royalty. The holding that
the 1/4th of royalty deed conveyed only a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty was based on the following
factors: (1) the usual lease royalty is a 1/8th royalty share and (2) it would be unjust to
construe the deed to convey a 1/4th of royalty when the grantor only owned a 1/2 of 1/8th
royalty, which was less than a 1/4th of royalty share to the potential 7/16th lease royalty.
Therefore, the reference to the prior deed “for all purposes” referred to the 1/2 of 1/8th royalty
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language of the formula evidences the specific intent that cannot be overridden by a general intent derived from the historical background of the
universality of the 1/8th lease royalty and a general assumption that the
fraction 1/8th was intended to encompass any fraction of lease royalty.
B. The Inconsistent Granting Clause: A Fraction Of and the Minimum
Royalty Provision
Brown v. Havard 34 involved the construction of the following royalty
reservation contained in a 1963 warranty deed:
Grantors reserve . . . in perpetuity an undivided one-half nonparticipating royalty (Being equal to, not less than an undivided
1
/16th) . . . . 35
Brown, the defendant, executed the deed in favor of the predecessors-ininterest of the plaintiffs, Havard, et al. (Havard). The land was then subject
to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty that was held during the
secondary term by payment of shut-in-gas royalties on a gas well, the Gill
No. 1. In 1973, Havard executed an oil and gas lease to M-Tex that
provided for a 3/8th lease royalty and covered the entire tract except for the
Gill No. 1 gas unit. M-Tex drilled four producing wells on the new lease.
Havard brought a declaratory judgment action contending that Brown
only reserved a 1/16th royalty in the M-Tex wells. 36 Havard argued, inter
share owned by the grantor and disclosed the intention to convey to the grantee 1/4th of that
1
/8th royalty.
Remuda illustrates the converse case. In Remuda, a 1/4th of royalty was construed as a
1
/4th of 1/8th royalty. However, this decision represents an instance in which additional
language in a deed results in an interpretation of a fractional share or fraction of royalty that
differs from the traditional construction.
34. 593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980).
35. Id. at 940.
36. The royalty to be paid on the pre-existing gas well was also an issue. Havard alleged
that Brown was only entitled to 1/16th of the proceeds from the gas well. Brown contended
that he was entitled to 1/2 of the gross production from the gas well and 1/2 of the 3/8ths
royalty from the M-Tex wells. The jury, based on extrinsic evidence, held that Brown was
entitled to 1/16th of the production from any well. The trial judge found the deed
unambiguous and entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The trial judge
determined that Brown was entitled to 1/2 of the production from the gas well and 1/2 of the
3
/8ths royalty from the M-Tex lease. Id. at 941.
The court on appeal held the deed was ambiguous, in part, because Brown was awarded
1
/2 of gross production from the gas well but only 1/2 of the 3/8ths royalty from the M-Tex
wells. Id. at 944. The dissent rejected the view that the difference in the trial judge’s award
as to the share of production from the gas well and the oil wells could be a basis for finding
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alia, that the deed was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence revealed that
the parties only intended a reservation of a 1/16th royalty. Brown contended
that the deed was unambiguous and reserved 1/2 of royalty, entitling him to
1
/2 of the 3/8ths lease royalty.
The case was tried to a jury which found, based on extrinsic evidence,
that Brown was only entitled to a 1/16th share of gross production. The trial
judge, who found the deed was not ambiguous and that it reserved a 1/2 of
royalty, entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and
awarded Brown an undivided of the lease royalty, being 3/16ths of gross
production.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The court found the deed
ambiguous and determined that the evidence supported the jury’s
determination that the parties intended only a reservation of a 1/16th royalty.
The Supreme Court of Texas, in a divided opinion, affirmed the appeals
court.
The majority of the Texas Supreme Court held the deed was ambiguous,
thus permitting the admission of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of
the parties. To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, a court applies established rules of interpretation. If the deed remains susceptible to more
than one interpretation, it is ambiguous. If only one meaning is clearly
evident, the deed is not ambiguous.
The majority predicated its decision that the reservation was ambiguous
on the following construction. The deed provided:
Grantors reserve . . . in perpetuity an undivided one-half nonparticipating royalty . . . . 37
The majority determined this language would reserve a 1/2 royalty, being
/2 of gross production, and not 1/2 of the royalty. However, the parenthetical
phrase, “Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th,” had “reference to
a reservation of royalty.” 38
The parenthetical phrase contained the ambiguity. One interpretation of
the language “Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th” was that it
1

ambiguity. Id. at 945. Instead, the dissent noted that Havard was the operator and owner of
the gas well and, more importantly, the judge’s verdict as to the 1/2 share of gross production
from the gas well was derived from a pre-trial stipulation made by the parties that agreed to
that division of the production from that well. Based upon the stipulation as to the division
of the gas well production, my analysis of the case will only consider the issue as to the
division of the 3/8ths M-Tex lease royalty in order to facilitate and simplify the discussion.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 942.
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reserved a 1/16th fractional share royalty. In effect, this interpretation leads
to the conclusion that the parties intended to reserve a 1/2 of the
conventional 1/8 royalty, “being equal to” a 1/16th royalty. Under this
interpretation, the language “not less than an undivided 1/16th” merely
provided for the contingency that if the lease royalty were ever reduced, the
1
/16th share would be received, insuring the reservation was a 1/2 of 1/8th
royalty.
The parenthetical phrase also supported an alternative interpretation of a
reservation of 1/2 of royalties contained in future leases with a proviso that
such share could not be less than 1/16th. This was the argument advanced by
Brown. However, the opinion cryptically noted that the presence of the
“comma” between the phrase “being equal to” and “not less than an
undivided 1/16th” must be ignored to permit this latter construction. In other
words, in the view of the majority, the presence of the “comma” in the
parenthetical phrase grammatically precluded construing that language as
intending to convey a 1/2 of royalties in future leases but not less than a 1/16th
share. To achieve that construction based on that language, the comma or
the grammatical construction must be ignored. 39 After reviewing the
extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial court, the majority affirmed the
Texas Court of Appeals’ determination that Brown intended to reserve a
1
/16th royalty share.
The dissenting opinion found the deed unambiguous and reserved to
Brown 1/2 of royalties with a minimum royalty set at 1/16th. The dissent
interpreted the parenthetical language as referring to the lease in existence
at the time the deed was executed as well as to future leases. Under the
existing lease, which had a 1/8th royalty clause, a reservation of 1/2 of
royalties would be equivalent to a 1/16th royalty. The inclusion of the words
“not less than an undivided 1/16th” only indicated that Brown contemplated
39. The specific language of the majority opinion on the possible construction of the
parenthetical phrase, “being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th,” is as follows:
The parenthetical language itself is subject to more than one interpretation. One
interpretation is that the parties intended to reserve 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th
royalty, “being equal to” a 1/16th. The additional phrase “not less than” insured
that the reservation was 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th royalty, and if the royalty
were reduced, the Browns would still receive their 1/16th. On the other hand, the
parenthetical language can be construed, as urged by the Browns, to reserve ½
of the royalties contained in future leases, providing further that the share must
not be less than 1/16th. Such construction must ignore the presence of the
“comma” between the phrase “Being equal to” and the phrase “not less than an
undivided 1/16th.”
Brown, 539 S.W.2d at 942.
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future leases on the property after the existing lease expired. In the event a
future lease provided for less than a 1/8th royalty, Brown would still be
entitled to a 1/16th royalty under the parenthetical clause. If the future lease
provided in excess of a 1/8th royalty, Brown was to share in 1/2 of that
royalty. The dissent’s view, in effect, was that the draftsman was merely
exercising caution to guarantee a certain minimum royalty.
Additionally, the dissent differed on the effect of the “comma” in the
parenthetical phrase. The dissent noted:
There is no language anywhere in the reservation clause to
indicate that the Browns’ royalty was to be limited to a
maximum of 1/16th: there is no language to the effect that 1/2 of
royalties is to be equal to not more than 1/16th. The reservation
does, however, unambiguously state that the Browns’ royalty
interest is to be not less than 1/16th. Describing a variable amount
as being equal to not less than 1/16 has the same result as
describing it as equal to or greater than 1/16. The absence of a
comma between the words “equal to” and “not less than” does
not change this meaning. The deed reserves 1/2 of royalties, and
the explanatory parenthetical sets a minimum of 1/16. The specific
fractional equivalent to 1/2 of royalties may vary according to the
lease so long as the Browns received their 1/16 minimum. 40
Brown v. Havard illustrates some of the perplexing problems
encountered by lawyers and laypersons when construing mineral or royalty
conveyances. Initially, one must be able to see the deed’s or reservation
clause’s potential for ambiguity and susceptibility to different interpretations. However, as noted by the Havard majority opinion, even if a deed or
reservation clause is susceptible to two constructions, it is not ambiguous if
one construction clearly predominates.
More importantly, the conclusion that the reservation is ambiguous may
be plausible but not irresistible. After all, in Havard, the grantor’s
reservation expressly specified a 1/2 non-participating royalty which was
intended as a 1/2 of royalty reservation. Havard never argued otherwise. This
specific reservation was followed by the parenthetical phrase in which the
majority found the ambiguity. When the reservation was created, an oil and
gas lease with a 1/8th royalty was in existence and the grantor could have intended to reserve a perpetual non-participating royalty, mindful at the time
that future leasing of the tract may occur. The grantor’s intent appears
40. Id. at 946.
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evident: the language of the parenthetical phrase was to insure that no less
than a 1/8th lease royalty would ever devalue the grantor’s perpetual royalty
interest. Did the grantor also intend the language “Being equal to” to
confine his royalty share to a 1/16th? What would your answer be if you did
not know that the jury had found that the parties intended the reservation of
a 1/16th share of production? 41
If in fact Brown’s intent was to reserve a 1/2 of royalty interest, adding
the parenthetical phrase only to insure that his royalty under any future
lease would be a minimum of 1/16th share, then the minimum royalty
provision that was drafted and designed to protect, in actuality, led to ruination. Although minimum royalty provisions may be a desirable addition to
the fraction of royalty grant or reservation in order to protect the royalty
owner from a low lease royalty negotiated by the executive owner, Havard
points out the necessity that such clauses be clearly and unambiguously
drafted so that the conveyance is to a fraction of royalty with a minimum
royalty limitation. Otherwise, as may have been the case in Havard, that
which was intended to help may in fact harm.
C. The Horrors of the Double Fraction
In Palmer v. Lide, 42 the Arkansas Supreme Court was construing a 1927
non-participating royalty deed that granted as follows:
do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey . . . an undivided oneeighth of one-eighth (1/8) interest in and to all of the oil gas and
other mineral royalty . . . . 43
Oil production was subsequently established on the land under a lease
providing for a 1/8th landowner’s royalty. Division orders were prepared
which reflected that the deed conveyed a 1/8th of 1/8th royalty, a 1/64th share
of gross production. The successors-in-interest of both the grantors
(plaintiffs) and the grantees (defendants) executed the division orders and
royalty was distributed to the parties on that basis until the operator
suspended the amount subsequently disputed. Plaintiffs then sued to recover
the suspended royalties and to determine their proper share of future
royalties.
The plaintiffs argued that the deed conveyed a 1/8th of 1/8th of royalty,
with the latter being fixed by the lease at 1/8th. Thus, according to the
41. This is the pithy question posed by Dean Smith in his analysis of Havard. See
Smith I, supra note 11, at G-4. The present author relies heavily on Smith’s analysis.
42. 567 S.W.2d 295 (Ark. 1978).
43. Id.
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plaintiffs, the deed conveyed 1/8th of 1/8th of 1/8th, being a 1/512th share of
gross production. The defendants argued that the deed, as reflected in the
original division orders, conveyed 1/8th of 1/8th royalty, being a 1/64th
production share. The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the trial court,
interpreted the deed as conveying 1/8th of 1/8th of the royalty, which under
the facts was a 1/512th share of gross production. Predictably, the court gave
effect to the plain language of the grant. The language unequivocally
conveyed a fraction (1/8) of a fraction (1/8) of a fraction (of royalty, being a
1
/8th share). The court observed that it simply “is not possible to interpret
the unmistakably clear language of the deed to mean 1/8th of 1/8th of the total
production.” 44
The defendants, who had been enjoying the royalty overpayment
occasioned by the inaccurate division orders, also argued vainly that the
plaintiffs were barred from claiming that the defendants were only entitled
to receive a 1/512th production share by adverse possession, laches, limitations or estoppel. The court, following Warmack v. Cross Co., 45 held that
the overpaid royalty owner did not acquire title by adverse possession or
acquiescence to the interest attributed to his ownership by a mistake of the
party who disbursed the proceeds of production. In addition, the court held
that one who erroneously received and kept overpayment for several years
was not in equity entitled to a continuation of the error.
One cannot quarrel with the construction of the “double fraction”
formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide and by other courts. 46 The
specific intent of the parties, arising from the plain language of the formula,
was unmistakable.
However, one is haunted by the fear that the “horrors of the double
fraction” may be the result of an error based simply on the parties’ selection
of the wrong royalty deed form. Perhaps intending only to convey a 1/8th of
1
/8th royalty, equal to a 1/64th share of gross production, the parties
mistakenly selected a printed form to convey a fraction of royalty and
inserted in the blank the fraction 1/8th of 1/8th which was followed in the
form by the salient of royalty language. Had the printed form selected been
for a fractional share conveyance, no mistake would have occurred and the
parties’ intent would have been effectuated.
Obviously, that one simple and single word “of,” succeeded by the term
“royalty,” was paramount in establishing the portion of the royalty share
44. Id. at 296.
45. 377 S.W.2d 47 (Ark. 1946).
46. Harris v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1955); Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563
(Tex. 1945).
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conveyed. Yet that simple distinction was probably lost on many
landowners, particularly in the early days of mineral conveyancing. That
common error, like the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing, 47 has likely
occasioned the loss of fortunes in oil and gas royalties.
D. The Large Fractional Share
Fractional share non-participating royalties are peculiarly worthy of
caution. The illustrative case is Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.,48 a Texas
Supreme Court case, wherein the Gavenda family reserved a 15-year nonparticipating royalty interest in a 1967 deed. The relevant part of the deed
provided:
an undivided one-half (1/2) non-participating royalty of all of the
oil and gas in, to and under that [sic] produced . . . .49
Subsequently, in 1978, the predecessor-in-interest to the grantee, who
owned the executive right to the Gavendas’ non-participating royalty,
executed an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th landowner’s royalty.
Thereafter, Strata Energy, Inc. and others acquired the oil and gas lease by
assignment and drilled two producing wells on the tract. 50

47. For a discussion of the Duhig rule of mineral conveyancing, see Willis H. Ellis,
Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 947 (1982).
48. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986).
49. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at 690.
50. Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957), provides
another example of a large fractional share royalty. The case involved the construction of a
reservation of a 49 year term royalty in which the first clause provided:
Grantor expressly reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns, a one-fourth
royalty in all oil, gas and other minerals in and under or hereafter produced . . ..
Id. at 820.
The last clause of the reservation indicated that the grantor’s reservation was nonparticipating as to the executive right, bonus, and delay rentals. At the end of this clause was
the following language:
but if oil, gas or other minerals be produced in commercial quantities, then
Grantor, . . . shall, during the term and existence of such reserved royalty, have
and receive one-fourth part of such oil, gas and other minerals so produced as a
royalty.
Id. (emphasis added).
The successors-in-interest of the grantees, the plaintiffs, argued that the reservation
created a 1/4th fraction of royalty, as opposed to a 1/4th fractional share royalty. Plaintiffs
argued that if a “comma” were inserted after the language “so produced” and before the
language “as a royalty,” then the words “so produced” would modify “produced in
commercial quantities,” and the words “as a royalty” would modify “one-fourth part of such
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Strata then hired an attorney to prepare a division order title opinion. The
examining attorney erroneously interpreted the reservation in the 1967 deed
as entitling the Gavenda family to a 1/16th royalty share, as opposed to a 1/2
royalty share. Obviously, the attorney erroneously construed the reservation
as a 1/2 of royalty, accruing 1/2 of the landowner’s royalty equal to a 1/64th of
gross production. Instead, the deed reserved a royalty which entitled the
Gavendas’ to a 1/2 of gross production.
Based on the title opinion, Strata prepared division orders, which the
Gavendas’ executed, that provided for the disbursement of their share of the
proceeds on a 1/16th royalty share. Thereafter, when members of the
Gavenda family died and the royalty ownership changed, transfer orders
were prepared and executed reflecting the 1/16th royalty ownership.
Apparently, during the administration of one of the estates, the error was
discovered. The Gavendas’ revoked their division and transfer orders two
days before the term interest expired. Thereafter, the Gavendas’ sued to
recover the unpaid 7/16th royalty share, amounting to more than $2.4 million
in unpaid royalties. In the litigation, the defendant lessees did not dispute
that the deed reserved a 1/2 royalty interest, equal to a 1/2 share of gross
production. Instead, they argued that the stipulation of ownership interest
contained in the division orders estopped the plaintiffs from claiming any
royalty in excess of the 1/16th interest.
The Supreme Court of Texas, reversing the trial court and the
intermediate appellate court, 51 held that the defendants were liable for the
unpaid royalties prior to the revocation of the division orders. Historically,
estoppel had been applied based on the stipulation of ownership interest
contained in the division order. Estoppel precluded the underpaid interest
owner from recovering the deficiency from the operator who relied on the
division order to distribute the proceeds of production.52 The court
oil, gas and other minerals.” Thus, the construction would be “1/4th royalty part of
production,” or a 1/4th of royalty.
The court observed that the “comma” could be inserted if necessary to arrive at the intent
of the parties. However, the court determined that when read along with the entire
reservation, the language at issue was clear and unambiguous. As to the grammatical
construction, the court noted that the words “so produced” and “as a royalty” followed the
same sequence as their respective antecedents. Further, the court explained that if the
grantors were only to receive “1/4th of royalty,” there would be no reason for the inclusion of
the article “a” that immediately preceded the word “royalty.” Therefore, a 1/4th fractional
share royalty was reserved.
51. 683 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), rev’d in part, 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986).
52. The division order has historically authorized the purchaser of production, or the
operator who disburses the proceeds of production, to receive the production and to
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reasoned, however, that estoppel was not applicable when the operator
made the error because a contrary result would allow the operator to profit
unjustly from the operator’s own mistake.
The court’s holding recognized that the attorney who misconstrued the
royalty reservation was being sued for malpractice but, as the attorney was
the agent of the defendants, his negligence was imputed to them.
E. Inconsistency in the Granting, Subject To and Future Leasing Clauses
Paralleling early mineral deeds, early non-participating royalty deed
forms and, occasionally, formally drafted royalty reservations often
contained multiple clauses in which different fractions could be inserted.
The granting clause designates the portion of the estate conveyed in the
deed. The designated “subject to” clause often recites that the interest
conveyed was subject to an outstanding oil and gas lease and specifies the
lease benefits that are covered and included in the grant. 53 The “futurelease” clause specifies the ownership interests that will be conveyed under
future leases after the existing lease has expired.54
distribute the proceeds from the sale pursuant to the specified division of interest.
Traditionally, if the proceeds are distributed pursuant to the division of ownership interest
specified in the executed division order, an interest owner is estopped to assert a claim
against the purchaser or operator for an inadequate payment. Dale v. Case, 64 So. 2d 344
(Miss. 1957); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). See also 4 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 4, § 704.5 for citations to other authorities.
In Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), the Supreme Court of
Texas held that the estoppel arising from reliance on the division of ownership interest
specified in the division order only precludes liability when the overpayment is made to a
third-party and is not retained by the party disbursing the proceeds of production.
53. The “subject to” and “future lease” clauses, and the problems of interpretation
resulting from conflicting fractions appearing in the various clauses, have been the subject of
a number of law review articles. Included in the following cites are articles containing an
analysis of the Texas cases and the infamous “two grant” or “multiple grant” constructions.
See Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed
Construction, 34 S. TEX. L.J. 73 (1993); Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the
“Repugnant to the Grant” Doctrine, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 635 (1990); Bruce Kramer, The
Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds and Leases, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (1993);
Ernest E. Smith, The “Subject To” Clause, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985)
[hereinafter Smith II].
54. The “covers and includes” language of the “subject to” clause typically specifies
that the grant “covers and includes” the share of the lease benefits that the grantee is to
receive pursuant to the outstanding oil and gas lease. Often the clause contains language that
indicates the interest that the grantee will own when the outstanding lease terminates and it
will also specify the share of the lease benefits the grantee will receive under a “future
lease.” Even though the latter language is contained in the “subject to” clause, to facilitate
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The practice of specifying the interests conveyed under existing and
future leases in the “subject to” and “future-lease” clauses can be attributed
to an early ill-fated Texas case. Caruthers v. Leonard 55 held that the grantee
of a fractional interest in a mineral estate that was subject to a pre-existing
oil and gas lease did not receive a right to his proportionate share of the
benefits under the lease. Caruthers was obviously bad law; its holding was
inconsistent with a basic common law principle of conveyancing, namely
that which is not specifically reserved from the grant is conveyed.
Eventually, some forty years later, Caruthers was overruled. 56 In the
absence of Caruthers, a “subject to” clause is only required to prevent the
grantor from breaching the covenants of title when the mineral estate
conveyed is burdened by a pre-existing oil and gas lease.
Deeds drafted to require the parties to fill in the blanks in separate
clauses, some of which relate to the different incidents of mineral
ownership such as the “subject to” and “future-lease” provisions, are
obviously susceptible to errors that present perplexing issues of judicial
interpretation. The focus of our inquiry is the problem which occurs when
the clauses utilize both a fractional share and a fraction of royalty.
However, the resolution of this issue is often intertwined with another
common problem: construing mineral conveyances that contain
inconsistencies between the “subject to,” “future lease” and granting
clauses occasioned by the use of disparate fractions to describe the quantum
of mineral interests or lease benefits conveyed and the royalty share
attributable thereto.
Disparate fractions in multiple provision deeds, which particularly
plagued early conveyances, were likely a result of the widespread confusion
relating to the difference in the shares of production attributable to
respective mineral and royalty fractional shares. For example, a grant of a
1
/16th mineral estate only entitled the grantee to 1/16th of the conventional
1
/8th lease royalty, equal to a 1/128th production share. Similarly, a grant of 1/2
of a mineral estate entitled the grantee to a 1/2 of the conventional 1/8th lease
royalty, equal to a 1/16th royalty share. Failing to fully understand this
distinction, parties intending to convey 1/2 a mineral estate and focusing on
the 1/16th share of royalty may have erroneously inserted the 1/16th fraction in

the discussion, the “future lease” language will be treated as a separate and distinct lease
provision.
55. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
56. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. 1943).
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the granting clause drafted to convey a mineral estate, while inserting the 1/2
fraction in the subject to or future lease clause.57

57. Heyen v. Harnett, 679 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 1984), a 1984 Kansas Supreme Court case,
best illustrates the problem. The court was construing a 1925 mineral deed in which the
granting clause conveyed a 1/16th mineral estate and the subject to clause provided:
if such land is covered by a valid mineral lease, the [grantee] . . . shall have an
undivided 1/2 interest in the Royalties, Rentals, . . . .
Id. at 1154.
The plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of the grantor, argued that the deed was
unambiguous; that it conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest as specified in the granting clause;
and that it only entitled the defendants, the successors-in-interest of the grantees, to an
undivided 1/16th of the royalties to a subsequent lease. The plaintiff further argued that the
“subject to” clause only provided for 1/2 of royalties if the land was then subject to an
existing oil and gas lease. Because there was no such lease, the plaintiff maintained that the
contingency failed, rendering the clause inapplicable to convey any interest in royalties
under subsequent leases.
In opposition, the defendant argued that the deed was ambiguous and conveyed a 1/2
mineral estate entitling the plaintiff to 1/2 of the royalties to be paid under the subsequent
lease. Finding the deed ambiguous, and admitting extrinsic evidence that indicated that the
parties had subsequently treated the conveyance as conveying a 1/2 mineral estate, the court
held that the deed conveyed a 1/2 mineral estate. In so doing the court made the following
observation:
It is not uncommon for parties to mineral deeds or reservations, where a royalty
or mineral interest is conveyed or reserved subject to an existing oil and gas
lease, to confuse the fractional interest conveyed or reserved.
Id. at 1158 (quoting Shepard, Ex’x v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 26
(Kan. 1962)).
The court continued to note that:
[a]s the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-eighth royalty
reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests stems primarily from
the mistaken premise that all the lessor-landowner owns is a one-eighth royalty.
In conveying minerals subject to an existing lease and also assigning a
corresponding fractional interest in the royalties received, mistake is often
made in the fraction of the minerals conveyed by multiplying the intended
fraction by one-eighth. Thus, if a conveyance of an undivided one-half of the
minerals is intended, the parties will multiply one-half by one-eighth and the
instrument will erroneously specify a conveyance of one-sixteenth of the
minerals upon the assumption that one-sixteenth is one-half of what the grantor
owns. An ambiguity is created because the instrument will also show that the
conveyance of one-sixteenth of the minerals is meant to entitle the grantor to
one-half of the royalty. Of course, an undivided one-half of the minerals is
needed to carry one-half of any royalties reserved.
Id. at 1158 (quoting Magnusson v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 731 P.2d 577, 583–84 (Kan.
1958)).
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1. The Texas Cases: The Decline, Fall and Resurrection of the Multiple
Grant Construction
The legacy of some early and highly criticized Texas cases 58 that
construed deeds as effectuating “two grants,” or more, continues to play a
prominent yet equivocal role in the Texas case law which deals with
inconsistencies between the granting, “subject to,” and “future lease”
clauses in mineral and royalty deeds. Under the “two grant” approach, if the
benefits conferred on the grantee in the “subject to” clause or the “future
lease” clause differ from the benefits derived from the interest conveyed in
the granting clause, the former clauses are construed as conveying such
benefits, along with but independent of the latter clause. In effect, such a
deed conveys not one but two or more grants.
If the “two grant” construction prevails, then a royalty deed with a
granting clause that conveys a “1/32nd of the oil and gas in and under and
that may be produced and saved” and a “future lease” clause that recites
that the grantee owns a “1/4th of the royalties” under “future leases” conveys
two separate and distinct interests. The two interests conveyed are a 1/32nd
fractional share royalty applicable to the existing lease and a “1/4th of
royalties” under subsequent leases. The “1/4th of royalties” clause would
entitle the grantee to its proportionate share of royalties in the future lease
in excess of the conventional 1/8th landowner’s royalty.
58. The “two grant doctrine” originated in the early Texas case of Hoffman v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), in which 90 acres in fee were
severed by deed from a 366 acre tract that was subject to an outstanding oil and gas lease.
The “subject to” clause in the deed provided, inter alia, that the grantee was to receive “1/2
of all oil royalty and gas rental or royalty due to be paid under the terms of said lease.” Id. at
829 (emphasis added).
The court construed the deed as executing two conveyances. The first conveyance
conveyed the 90 acre tract in fee. The second conveyance, effectuated by the “subject to”
clause, conveyed 1/2 of the royalties under the existing lease as to the entire 366 acre tract.
The court reasoned that the “subject to” clause covered 1/2 of the royalty from the “said
lease” and was not restricted to royalties accruing from production on the 90 acre tract.
The construction in Hoffman has been universally condemned. The likely intent of the
parties in inserting the “subject to” clause was to avoid the rule announced in Caruthers and
to ensure that the grantee received 1/2 of the rentals and royalties as to the 90 acre tract
conveyed. It seems unlikely that the parties would have utilized the “subject to” clause to
convey 1/2 of the royalties under the entire 366 acre tract.
For a discussion of the origin and applicability of the “subject to” clause, including
Hoffman and the “two grant” theory prior to Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991),
see Smith II, supra note 53. For a discussion that covers Hoffman and the Texas cases
through Luckel and Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991), see infra notes
69–73. See also Burney, supra note 53, at 89–105 and Kramer, supra note 53, at 19–43.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/6

2017]

Lands Burdened by Non-Participating Royalty

453

Although some early Texas cases applied the “two grant” theory in some
oil and gas deed construction cases, 59 the theory was not applied to cases
which involved conflicting fractions in mineral or royalty deeds. Instead,
the traditional “four corners” rule of construction was utilized.60 This
59. Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945), illustrates the applicability of the
two grant doctrine. The Texas Supreme Court held, inter alia, that a deed with a granting
clause purporting to convey a 1/16th of 1/8th mineral interest and a subject to clause reciting
that it “covers and includes 1/16 of 1/8 of all the oil royalty” conveyed two distinct grants. Id.
at 563–64 (emphasis added). The granting clause conveyed a 1/16th of 1/8th or a 1/128th
minerals interest, and the “subject to” clause also conveyed a 1/16th of 1/8th of royalty or a
1
/1024th of gross production.
The court determined that the fact that the first grant of 1/128th mineral interest, when
taken in conjunction with the existence of a lease with a 1/8th landowner’s royalty would
entitle the grantee to a 1/1024th share of production, an amount equal to the royalty share
granted in the subject to clause, was irrelevant as to the existence of the “two grants.”
Referring to the grant in the subject to clause, the court observed:
The fact that it fixes the share in the present royalties the same as would have
obtained by operation of law does not lessen its force and effect as a
conveyance. As is often the case such payment of royalty might have been
larger or smaller than a pro rata share.
Id. at 565.
In addition to Richardson, the other “two grant” theory cases that appeared after
Hoffman v. Magnolia, 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), are Benge v. Scharbauer,
259 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1953), and Woods v. Sims, 273 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1954), which like
Hoffman, are factually unrelated to disparate fractions in the granting, “subject to,” or
“future lease” clauses. For a discussion of these cases, see Smith II supra note 53; Burney
supra note 53; Kramer supra note 53.
60. Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957), is viewed by some commentators
as a milestone case that departed from the “two grant” theory in favor of the “four corners”
rule of construction. The case involved the misconception of the difference between
fractional shares of mineral and royalty interests. The granting clause purported to convey an
“undivided 1/64th interest in the minerals” while the subject to clause included “1/8th of any
royalties and 1/8th of said money rentals payable by the lessee.” The future lease clause
provided the grantee would own:
one-eighth of the lease interests and all future rentals . . . , he owning oneeighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas and other minerals . . . together with oneeighth interest in all future rents.
Id. at 905. The lease in existence expired and a subsequent lease was executed that provided
for a 1/8th royalty. The issue presented was whether the grantee was entitled to 1/64th of
royalty or a 1/64th royalty share under the subsequent lease.
The Texas Supreme Court in a divided opinion held, inter alia, that the deed conveyed a
1
/8th of the minerals entitling the grantee to 1/8th of the royalty, or a 1/64th royalty share. The
majority construed the deed from its “four corners,” viewing all of the clauses collectively,
to ascertain the intent of the parties. First, the majority noted that the granting clause
purported to convey a 1/64th mineral interest. However, the “subject to” clause indicated that
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approach employs conventional rules of interpretation to ascertain the
parties’ intent.
However, Farmers Canal Co. v. Potthast, 61 a 1979 Texas Civil Appeals
Court case, was decided under the “four corners” standard. Hindsight
reveals that this decision was a harbinger of what was to come. The case
dealt with the construction of a 1945 non-participating royalty deed in
which the granting clause conveyed “a one-fourth (1/4th) interest in and to
all of the . . . oil royalty, gas royalty, . . . .” 62 A “future lease” clause also
recited:
It is distinctly understood and herein stipulated and agreed . . .
that Grantee shall only receive one-fourth (1/4th) of the money
royalty on sulphur . . . and one-fourth (1/4th) of the one-eighth
(1/8th) royalty on oil, gas and all other minerals provided for in
such lease or leases; and in the event Grantors, their heirs, or
assigns, in the status of the fee owners of the minerals shall operate and develop the minerals therein, Grantee, his heirs and
assigns, shall own and be entitled to receive as a free royalty an
undivided one-thirty-second (1/32nd) of all of the sulphur, oil, gas
and other minerals produced, saved and sold off the
premises . . . . 63
Apparently the land was not leased until 1972, when the plaintiffs,
successors-in-interest to the grantors, executed an oil and gas lease that
provided for a 1/6th royalty on oil and gas. Production was established on
the lease.
The plaintiffs sought a judicial determination that the deed only
conveyed a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty. Naturally, the defendants, the successorsthe parties understood a 1/64th of the minerals to embrace a 1/64th royalty or 1/8th of the 1/8th
royalty. The language of the “future lease” clause which provided that the grantee would
own 1/8th of 1/8th of the minerals reflected the parties’ intent to convey a 1/8th of the royalty
under future leases. Further, the language in the latter clause which provided that the grantee
acquired “1/8th of the lease interest and future rentals” indicated that the grantee had the right
to lease an undivided 1/8th interest and to receive 1/8th of the bonus and rentals. In essence,
the parties intended that the grantee was to share in the same royalty under future leases as
the existing lease and was conveyed a 1/8th mineral interest.
For a more detailed analysis of Garrett as applying the “four corners” rule of
construction and, more importantly, rejecting the “two grant” theory, see Burney, supra note
53, at 95–106.
61. 587 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).
62. Id. at 807.
63. Id.
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in-interest of the grantees, argued that the deed conveyed a 1/4th of royalty
which entitled them to 1/4th of a 1/6th royalty share. The court held that the
grantees were conveyed a 1/4th of royalty, and the defendants were entitled
to a 1/24th share of gross production.
In so holding, the court recited the standard rule of deed construction, the
“four corners” rule. This rule requires that the court attempt to determine
the parties’ intent by considering all language appearing in the deed and by
harmonizing, if possible, those provisions which appear to conflict. The
court, however, also recited and applied other rules of construction. The
rule construing the deed against the grantor if doubt exists as to the
intention of the parties was applied by the court. Additionally, the court
applied the rule indicating that if there is a “necessary repugnance” of
clauses in the conveyance, the granting clause prevails. Thus, because the
granting clause specified a grant of 1/4th of royalty while the future leasing
clause restricted the royalty to 1/4th of 1/8th, the court determined that the
granting clause prevailed and that the deed conveyed a 1/4th of royalty.
Subsequently, in 1984, the Texas Supreme Court in Alford v. Krum 64
adopted the “repugnancy to the grant” theory to resolve inconsistencies
between the granting, subject to, and future lease clauses. The case involved
the construction of a 1929 deed in which the granting clause conveyed a 1/2
of 1/8th mineral interest; the “subject to” clause provided for a 1/16th of
royalty under the existing lease; and the “future lease” clause provided:
in the event that the said above described lease for any reason
becomes canceled or forfeited, . . . the lease interests and all
future rentals on said land, for oil, gas and mineral privileges
shall be owned jointly by . . . [Grantors and Grantees] . . . each
owning a one-half interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in
and upon said land, together with one-half interest in all future
rents. 65
The lease in effect at the time the deed was executed had expired.
The trial court construed the deed as conveying a 1/16th mineral estate (1/2
of 1/8th). The Texas Court of Appeals, emphasizing the language of the
future leasing clause, reversed the trial court and held that the deed
conveyed a 1/2 mineral estate. In a divided opinion, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the Texas Court of Appeals and held that the deed conveyed
a 1/16th mineral estate.
64. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
65. Id. at 872 (emphasis added).
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The majority’s holding was premised on the rule of construction which
states that, when irreconcilable conflict exists between the granting clause
and other clauses in the deed, the granting clause prevails. The majority
reasoned that when an irreconcilable conflict precludes a harmonization of
internally inconsistent expressions of intent, the granting clause, which
contains the “controlling language” and the “key expression of intent,”
prevails. Further, the majority observed that the “well established” purpose
of the future lease clause was to “explain or restate” the operative effect of
the grant contained in the granting clause when the present lease terminates
and future leases are executed. Finally, the majority emphasized that the
language of the granting clause was clear and specific while the language of
the future lease clause was unclear.
The dissent, by Chief Justice Pope, offered the following analysis of the
deed. The granting clause first conveyed a 1/2 of 1/8th or a 1/16th mineral
estate. The “subject to” clause then recognized the existence of an
outstanding oil and gas lease and expressly subjected the 1/16th conveyance
to the outstanding lease. The dissent then noted that the majority had also
held that the deed presently conveyed the “possibility of reverter” to that
1
/16th interest upon termination of the lease. Up to this point in the dissent’s
analysis, the dissent did not disagree with the majority.
Instead, the dissent’s disagreement related to the “future lease” clause.
The dissent viewed this clause as conveying a “different and a greater
estate” upon termination of the outstanding lease. According to the dissent,
“the ridgepole that divides the rights conveyed before reverter from those
conveyed after the reversion” is the language that provides, upon
cancellation of the outstanding lease, “the lease interests ‘and all future
rentals on said land [should] be owned jointly . . . by the grantors and
grantees . . . each own[ing] a one-half interest in the oil, gas and other
minerals.’ ” 66 The dissent further noted that there was no ambiguity in a
deed that granted a 1/16th mineral estate so long as there was an outstanding
lease and a 1/2 mineral estate upon the lease’s termination. The dissent
explained that the fractions were different for a good reason.67
Even though the deed was construed to contain “multiple grants,” the
dissent also emphasized the applicability of the “four corners” rule of

66. Id. at 874.
67. Id. at 875. Although the dissent did not elaborate on the “good reason,” I would
speculate that a 1/16th mineral estate subject to a lease that yields or may yield a 1/16th of 1/8th
royalties may be of equal or greater value to an undivided 1/2 mineral estate after the lease
expires when prospective royalties or bonuses are speculative.
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construction. 68 More important are the characteristics of these multiple
grants recognized by the dissent. First, the conveyance of a mineral estate
which fluctuates in size according to time was recognized by the dissent.
Second, the dissent recognized the grant of an undivided 1/16th interest when
the land was burdened by an outstanding lease. Third, a subsequent grant of
an undivided 1/2 interest when the lease expired was recognized by the
dissent. 69
Two points emerge from the Alford decision. One is that the majority
adopted the “repugnant to the grant” rule of construction. This rule provides
that the granting clause prevails over the “subject to” and “future lease”
provisions when an irreconcilable conflict between former and latter
clauses exists. This rule has some advantages, namely simplicity of
application and certainty of title. Many deeds with disparate fractions as to
mineral or royalty interests arising from the inclusion of a “subject to” or
“future lease” clause do present irreconcilable conflicts which are impossible to internally harmonize with the granting clause. Thus, by applying this
rule, a title examiner often can determine the scope of the conveyance
without resort to litigation.
The problem with resolving the issue through application of the
“repugnant to the grant” rule of construction is that the result achieved may
not reflect the intent of the parties. Under the “repugnant to the grant”
construction, the intent is ascertained by glorifying the granting clause over
another clause in the deed. In fact, the language contained in the granting
clause may be less dispositive as to the intent of the parties than the
language found in another clause. The reign of the Alford decision was
short-lived, however. 70 In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court in Luckel v.

68. The opinion also cited and endorsed Garrett v. Dils, 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957).
For a discussion of Garrett, see supra note 60.
69. See Burney, supra note 53, at 93.
70. During its short reign, the rule was applied in two appellate cases. In Hawkins v.
Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 724 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), the granting clause conveyed
a 1/32nd fractional share royalty while the “future lease” clause specified a 1/4th mineral
estate. The granting clause conveyed a 1/4th of 1/8th royalty and the future lease provision
specified a 1/4th mineral estate upon termination of the existing lease. The holding in Alford
was followed and the granting clause prevailed resulting in the deed only conveying a 1/32nd
royalty share. Hawkins provides a detailed and lucid account of the evolution of the “two
grant” and “repugnancy to the grant” theories.
In Stag Sales Co. v. Flores, 697 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), the granting clause
specified a 1/2 of royalty while the “subject to” and “future lease” clause specified a 1/16th
royalty. The subsequent oil and gas lease provided for a 1/6th landowner’s royalty. Again,
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White, 71 another divided opinion, reversed the “repugnancy to the grant”
rule of construction and specifically overturned Alford.
Luckel involved the construction of a 1935 royalty deed. Mayes, the
grantor, conveyed a royalty interest to Luckel by a deed in which the
granting, habendum, and warranty clauses recited that a 1/32nd fractional
share royalty was conveyed. The “subject to” and “future lease” clauses
stated that the grantee was entitled to receive “1/4th of any and all
royalties.” 72 When the deed was executed, the land was subject to an oil and
gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty that subsequently expired. Many years
later, the land was subject to numerous leases, some of which provided for
a 1/6th royalty. A declaratory judgment action was brought to determine if
the successors-in-interest of the grantee, Luckel, were entitled to a 1/32nd or
a 1/4th of 1/6th share of gross production from the excess royalty clauses.
The majority opinion applied the “four corners” rule of construction.
This rule requires the court to ascertain the intent of the parties by
attempting to harmonize all parts of the deed and to only strike down a part
of the deed when its effect is destroyed by an irreconcilable conflict with
another part of the instrument. The Luckel majority ascertained the parties’
intent by harmonizing the conflict between the granting clause and the
“future lease” clause. The court accomplished this by determining that the
granting clause conveyed a 1/32nd interest (or 1/4th of the royalty under the
existing lease) until the existing lease expired and that the “future lease”
clause presently conveyed the possibility of reverter as to 1/4th of royalties.
Thus, as to future leases, the latter clause conveyed a 1/4th of the total
reserved royalty. Because the harmonization of the Mayes-Luckel deed
conflicted with the construction of the deed in Alford, the latter case was
expressly overruled. The court further held that the outright grant of a 1/32nd
fixed royalty in the granting clause did set the minimum of the royalty for
the 1/4th royalty conveyed pursuant to the “future lease” clause.

following Alford, the granting clause prevailed. Thus, the deed conveyed a 1/2 of royalty
entitling the grantees to a l/12th production share.
71. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Ark. 1991).
72. The deed also contained a clause that recited that it was “understood . . . that Mayes
is the owner of one-half of the royalties to be paid under the terms of the present existing
lease, the other one-half having been previously transferred by her to her children, and by
the execution of this instrument, . . . Mayes conveyed one-half of her one-sixteenth (1/16th)
royalty now reserved by her.” Id. at 461.
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Luckel v. White resurrected the “two grant” doctrine in Texas deed
construction. 73 Although the language of the “four corners” rule of
construction which requires the court to harmonize all clauses of the
instrument if possible was present in the court’s opinion, the Luckel court’s
recognition of and emphasis on the two separate and distinct grants
emerging from the granting clause and the “future lease” clause is
inescapable. The court determined that because the granting clause
conveyed a 1/32nd fractional royalty share under the existing lease and the
“future lease” clause conveyed a 1/4th of royalty as to the possibility of
reverter which would become possessory apparently upon the execution of
the future lease, a conveyance of simultaneous interests occurred. 74 The

73. The conclusion that Luckel v. White represents a return to the “two grant” mode of
construction by the Texas Supreme Court is reinforced by Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819
S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991), a case decided the same day as Luckel. There, the issue involved
the construction of a 1918 mineral deed that had been executed when the land was then
subject to an oil and gas lease providing for a 1/8th royalty. The deed contained a granting
clause conveying a 1/16th mineral interest and a “future lease” clause that provided, inter alia,
that if the existing lease terminated without production, the grantee herein or his assigns “are
to have . . . under this conveyance an undivided 1/2 of all the oil. [sic] gas or other
mineral . . . and it is the intention of the grantors herein that in the event said lease is
forfeited, then in that event the grantee is to have and hold an equal undivided one half of all
such minerals.” Id. at 468. Apparently, the lessee drilled a producing well on the assumption
that the deed only conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest and the accounting as to a cotenancy
would only be on a 1/16th net profits basis.
The plaintiffs, the successors-in-interest to the grantee, argued that the deed conveyed a
1
/2 mineral interest and sought an accounting on a 1/2 net profits basis. The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and applied Alford, holding that the deed, pursuant to
the granting clause that controlled the inconsistent “subject to” clause, only conveyed a 1/16th
mineral interest. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held that the granting clause
conveyed a 1/16th mineral interest while the “subject to” clause simultaneously conveyed a
7
/16th interest in the possibility of reverter in the mineral estate. Thus, when the existing lease
expired, the grantee owned a 1/2 fee mineral estate. As a result, the lessee had to account on a
1
/2 net profits basis. Although noting that the case had been overruled in Luckel, the court in
Jupiter Oil distinguished Alford on the basis that the deed in Jupiter Oil unambiguously
granted a 1/16th fee mineral interest and a 7/16ths interest in the possibility of reverter to the
mineral estate.
To fully comprehend the “two grant” analysis, Jupiter Oil should be compared with
Heyen v. Harnett, 679 P.2d 1152 (Kan. 1984), wherein the Kansas Supreme Court reached
the same result on a different theory. For a discussion of Heyen, see supra note 57.
74. The court opined that the only difference between the deed in Alford and the deed in
Luckel was that the former was a mineral deed while the latter was a royalty deed and that
this distinction was immaterial. Thus, deeds involving disparate mineral and royalty
fractions are to be construed by the Luckel standard. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463.
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interests differed only as to the share conveyed and the time in which the
interests were to become possessory.
This determination is a rather sophisticated theory as to the intent of the
parties to a 1935 royalty deed. The criticism of Luckel v. White, which is
the enduring criticism of the “two grant” theory, is that it is unlikely the
parties intended two separate grants in the deed. As stated by the dissenting
opinion:
The oft-repeated expression that a grantor has the power to
convey by one instrument different interests in the possibility of
reverter and under the subsisting lease should not obscure the
fact that very few grantors really intend to convey interests of
different magnitude. 75
The flawed theory of Luckel does not necessarily make the result wrong.
The effect is the same as if the deed had been construed against the grantor.
However, the dissent disagreed with the result as well as the “two grant”
rationale. The dissent would have taken judicial notice of the fact that the
standard lease royalty in 1935 was a 1/8th share. Thus, the parties did not
then contemplate that a 1/4th of royalties might not always equal a 1/32nd
production share. The granting clause intended to convey a permanent grant
of a 1/32nd royalty interest. Under this view, the “future lease” clause’s “1/4th
of royalties” was used only to extend the 1/32nd production share to future
leases.
Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the resurrection of the “two grant”
doctrine to mineral and royalty conveyances, no one mourned the loss of
Alford, except of course title examiners who determined ownership on the
basis of the “repugnancy to the grant” theory and their clients who made
investments in mineral and royalty titles in reliance on Alford.
2. The Arkansas Cases
Barret v. Kuhn, 76 is the first Arkansas Supreme Court case construing a
non-participating royalty deed that contained both a fractional share and a
fraction of royalty. The royalty deeds at issue were executed in the 1940’s
when there was no production on the land. The deeds were titled “Royalty
Deeds.” The term “non-participating” was printed underneath the title. The
granting clause provided:

75. Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 466. The dissent was quoting from 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 4, § 340.2.
76. 572 S.W.2d 135 (Ark. 1978).
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do hereby grant . . . an undivided one sixty-fourth (1/64) interest
in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, under and upon
the following described lands . . . . 77
Following the granting clause was a “minimum royalty” 78 clause that the
court referred to as a “royalty” clause:
Provided, that the grantors herein expressly covenant with the
grantee that no oil and gas mining lease shall ever be executed
covering the above land, or any part thereof, that shall reserve to
the grantors herein, their heirs and assigns, as royalty, less than
one-eighth of all of the oil and gas produced and saved from said
land—and this covenant shall be deemed a covenant running
with the land. 79
Following the “minimum royalty” clause was an “intention” clause
which the court also treated as part of the “royalty” clause:
It is the intention of the parties hereto that the grantee herein, its
successors or assigns, shall be entitled to receive hereunder oneeighth of all oil and/or gas run to the credit of the royalty
interest reserved under and by virtue of any oil and gas mining
lease now in force and effect . . . , and under any oil and gas
mining lease hereafter executed . . . .80
Additionally, after the royalty clause there was a “production” clause:
and in any event the grantee herein, its successors or assigns,
shall be deemed the owner of and shall be entitled to receive one
sixty-fourth of all oil and gas produced and saved from said
land . . . . 81
Thereafter, the plaintiffs, successors-in-interest to the grantors, and
owners of the executive right, executed oil and gas leases that provided for
overriding royalties of either 1/8th or 1/16th in addition to a 1/8th landowner’s
royalty. After production was established on the land, division orders were
prepared that provided for the owners of the non-participating royalty, the
grantees, to share in the overriding royalty as well as the lease royalty.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Barret, 572 S.W.2d at 137.
The court referred to the clause as a “royalty” clause. Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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Litigation ensued to determine the proper division of the royalty and
overriding royalties between the plaintiffs and defendants.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the chancellor,
held that the nonparticipating royalty owners were only entitled to a 1/64th
share of production which precluded their participation in the overriding
royalty. The court reasoned that the granting clause, as further evidenced by
the language of the “production clause,” conveyed only a 1/64th interest in
the oil, gas and minerals produced. This interpretation clearly limited the
claim of the nonparticipating royalty owners because if these royalty
owners were to participate in the overriding royalty interest, they would
receive more than a 1/64th interest. In effect, the court construed the deed as
granting a fractional royalty interest.
The rationale for this result can be premised on the applicability of the
rule of construction which provides that the granting clause, specifying the
fractional share, controls over the inconsistent “royalty clause,” with its
fraction of royalty language. In effect, the “repugnancy to the grant” rule of
construction was applied. But the case can also be read as holding that the
fraction of language in the “royalty clause” was only intended by the parties
to permit the royalty owners to participate in the 1/8th lease royalty. 82
Anadarko Petroleum Co. v. Venable, 83 a 1993 Arkansas Supreme Court
case, also involved the construction of nonparticipating royalty deeds
containing conflicting fractional share and fraction of royalty clauses.
Because the deeds are identical in form, differing only as to the fractional
shares conveyed, the discussion will focus exclusively on one deed, the
“Royal” deed.
The deed was executed in 1939 while the lands were subject to an
existing oil and gas lease, the Tissue lease, that provided for a 1/8th royalty.
The deed contained the following granting clause:
the grantee . . . shall at all times subsequent to the execution of
this instrument, receive a (13/1920ths) . . . part of all oil, gas and
other minerals produced and saved from the above described
land, . . . which provision and agreement is a covenant which
shall run with the land . . . . 84

82. This reading of Barret is premised on the court’s articulation of the issue as to
whether the “1/8th of royalty” language in the royalty clause permitted the royalty owners to
share in “all royalty revenue” or the “usual 1/8th royalty.” Id. at 136.
83. 850 S.W.2d 302 (Ark. 1993).
84. Anadarko, 850 S.W.2d at 303.
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The deed then contained the following subject to clause which the court
described as a “second” granting clause:
It is understood that this land is encumbered with an oil and gas
lease, executed by J.G. Tissue, a widower as Lessors, to Record
Owners as Lessee, on — , which lease is recorded in Book — ,
at Page — , . . . .
And for the same consideration the Grantors do hereby
bargain, grant, sell, convey and set over onto the Grantee an
undivided (13/240ths) . . . part of all royalties on oil or gas
produced from the above described land during the term of said
lease, or any extension thereof. 85
In the 1980’s, sometime after the expiration of the Tissue lease, the
mineral owners executed oil and gas leases that provided for a 3/16th
royalty. 86 The defendant, Anadarko Petroleum Co., the lessee, drilled
producing wells on the leased lands. In 1983, the plaintiffs, the successorsin-interest of the grantees, executed division orders in favor of the
defendant. The defendant was disbursing the proceeds from production and
had calculated their royalty share as a straight 13/1920th share of production
which was equivalent to payment on a 1/8th royalty basis.
In 1991, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in chancery court to establish
their right to participate in the royalty on a 3/16th basis. The Arkansas
Supreme Court, affirming the holding of the chancellor below, interpreted
the 1939 deed as granting a fraction of royalty which permitted the plaintiffs to share in the royalty on a 3/16ths basis.
The court’s holding was premised on two bases. First, the portion of
royalty granted, in the deed had to be determined by reading the “first”
granting clause which granted a straight fractional share in conjunction
with the “second” granting clause which granted a fraction of royalty. In so
doing, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the fraction of
royalty contained in the second granting clause was merely “explanatory,”
describing the scope of the fractional share conveyed in the first granting
clause. The court reasoned that the language of the second granting clause

85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. The opinion alternatively describes the royalty share at issue as an overriding
royalty and as a lease royalty share. For purposes of this discussion, I have assumed that the
3
/16th share of royalty was a landowner’s royalty share.
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“utilized all the terms of art of conveyance” and granted an “additional
fractional one-eighth of” that was initially conveyed in the lease. 87
Additionally, the defendant argued that the language of the second
granting clause, “during the term of said lease or any extension thereof,”
indicated the parties did not contemplate that the clause would be
applicable to “future leases.” The court rejected that argument and affirmed
the chancellor’s finding that the subsequently executed oil and gas leases
were an “extension” of the previously expired Tissue lease. Therefore,
subject to the second granting clause, the grant of a fraction of royalty
required payment of royalties on the 3/16th basis.
Despite the fact that the deed contained two granting clauses (the court
emphasized and interpreted the second granting clause as intending to
effectuate a conveyance), the case does not follow the “two grant” theory of
Luckel v. White. In effect, by applying the “four corners” rule of construction, the court found that the parties to the conveyance intended the
latter fraction of “royalty clause” to control over the former fractional share
clause.
Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff’s execution of the division
order, which calculated their royalty share on a 1/8th basis, did not preclude
recovery from the defendant for the underpayment occasioned by the failure
to pay royalty on the 3/16th basis. Although the court recognized the general
rule that the purchaser of production may rely on the division order in
making payment to the interest owners and not be liable in tort or contract
for underpayment, the court refused to apply the rule for three reasons.
First, the division order did not specifically indicate plaintiff’s ratification
of the calculation of his ownership share or waiver of the right to challenge
the calculation of his ownership share. Second, plaintiff’s lack of
knowledge of the 1980 leases providing for the 3/16th royalty share prior to
filing suit precluded applicability of the doctrine of estoppel and laches.
Third, the record was devoid of any evidence regarding any payments made
by Anadarko that interjected the rights of innocent third parties.88
The court’s holding and rationale as to the failure of the division order to
protect an operator paying royalty pursuant to its terms are difficult to
87. Anadarko, 850 S.W.2d at 306.
88. The court also held that the plaintiff’s action was not time-barred. Thus, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for the deficiency that accrued from the date of the execution of the
division order in 1983. The statute of limitations applicable to division orders, Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-56-111 (1987) which prescribes a five year limitations period for actions relating
to written contracts, was tolled by the “partial payments,” i.e., the underpayment. Anadarko,
850 S.W.2d at 307.
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determine from the language of the opinion. One would assume from the
facts that Anadarko was making the excess royalty share payment, a 1/16th
share, to the owners of the mineral estate who were burdened by the
plaintiff’s non-participating royalty interest. If so, pursuant to Gavenda, the
operator was not unjustly enriched and should not have been liable for the
period prior to plaintiff’s revocation of the division order according to
traditional theory. 89
V. The Duty Of Care The Executive Right
Owes To The Non-Participating Royalty Owner
The problem that peculiarly 90 haunts non-participating royalty interests
to a fraction of royalty 91 is that the owners do not participate in the leasing
of the land which determines the quantum of lease royalty that they will
receive from production. The owner of the executive right to the mineral
estate negotiates and executes the oil and gas lease which fixes the amount
of bonus, delay rentals and royalty to be paid under the lease. Thus, absent
a judicial standard regulating the conduct owed by the owner of the
executive right to the non-participating royalty owner, the latter would be at
the mercy of the former as to the share of royalty received under the lease.
Typically, but not always, 92 the owner of the mineral estate burdened by
the non-participating royalty interest owns the executive right, as well as
the right to the bonus and delay rental payments. Additionally, the mineral
owner may also own the remaining share of royalty, if any, which has not
been severed by prior non-participating royalty conveyances. An inherent
conflict will exist between the mineral owner, who owns no interest or a
partial interest in the royalty, and the non-participating royalty owner over
the negotiation of the lease terms. The non-participating royalty owner will
89. See the discussion at supra notes 48–53.
90. For a discussion of the myriad instances in which the requisite standard of care that
the executive rights owner owes to the non-executive interest holder is applicable, see 2
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.
91. The same problem exists to grants or reservations of “all of the royalty,” a phrase
which encompasses all of the landowner’s lease royalty. To facilitate the discussion as to the
standard of care, the reference to the fraction of royalty includes the “all of the royalty”
conveyancing phenomena.
92. A “naked” executive right, entitling the holder thereof to the development and
leasing rights, may be severed in fee from the mineral estate without the executive rights
holder owning any other interest in the mineral estate. The ownership of the non-executive
interest is to a “non-participating mineral estate.” See RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS §§ 2.2 and 2.7(H) (West 3d ed. 1992).
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want the maximum lease royalty. The mineral owner, however, has the
incentive 93 to negotiate for a reduced lease royalty to maximize bonus 94 and
delay rental payments. Likewise, looking for a future leasing opportunity
and an additional bonus, the mineral owner may bargain for a lower royalty
to obtain a shorter primary term. Finally, if the mineral owner also owns the
surface, the lease royalty may be sacrificed for surface damage or nondevelopment clauses.
The protection of the non-participating royalty owner lies in the standard
of care imposed on the owner of the executive interest when negotiating
lease benefits on behalf of the executive and non-executive interests. 95 The
93. Further complicating the applicability of the requisite standard of care, the executive
holder may be motivated to negotiate for a reduced royalty share in an attempt to acquire a
shorter primary term that may yield additional leasing opportunities with another bonus,
surface damages, or non-development clauses. For a general discussion, see Ernest E. Smith,
Implications of a Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the Holder of the Executive Right, 64
TEX. L. REV. 371, 386–88 (1985) [hereinafter Smith III].
94. An additional complication is the fact that “bonus,” the consideration paid to the
mineral owner for executing the oil and gas lease, need not be paid, as it typically is, in the
form of a cash payment. Any consideration may be paid as bonus, including a share of
production, such as an overriding royalty interest or a production payment. When the lease
benefits include a share of production, in addition to the landowner’s royalty share, the issue
presented is whether the share of production is “bonus” to be paid to the mineral owner or
“royalty” to be paid to the royalty owner.
Two differing views exist in the case law. The Texas cases determine whether a share of
production is bonus or royalty solely by whether the interest reserved has the generally
accepted characteristics which define bonus or royalty. If the share of production is paid
over the life of the lease, it is royalty. If it is a sum certain to be paid out of production, it is
bonus. The parties’ express designation as to whether the interest is bonus or royalty is not
controlling under Texas law. Thus, in Griffith v. Taylor, 291 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. 1956),
the reservation in an oil and gas lease of a 1/16th share of gross production to be paid over the
life of the lease that expressly stated that it was “in addition to the royalties . . . , as
additional consideration and bonus royalty” reserved a royalty interest. See also Lane v.
Elkins, 441 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). Texas has consistently held that the typical
overriding royalty reservation in an oil and gas lease is royalty that is to be paid to the
royalty owner.
In Oklahoma, the parties’ designation in the lease as to whether the interest is bonus or
royalty is determinative. Therefore, the intent, and not the characteristics of the interest
reserved, is conclusive as to whether a production share granted in addition to royalty is
bonus or royalty. The basis of the Oklahoma rule is Sykes v. Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416
(Okla. 1957), wherein the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a share of production in
excess of a 1/8th royalty intended by the parties to be a part of the consideration for the
execution of the lease is bonus.
95. For a citation to the extensive literature on the duty that the executive owes the nonexecutive interest in negotiating the oil and gas lease, see Joshua M. Morse & Jaimie A.
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evolution of that standard has not been uniform or without controversy. 96
The prevailing standards have been the traditional “utmost fair dealing”
standard, sometimes referred to as the “prudent landowner” standard, and
the “fiduciary” standard originating in the 1985 Texas case of Manges v.
Guerra. 97
A. The Utmost Fair Dealing Standard
The “utmost fair dealing” 98 standard measures the duty the mineral
owner owes to the non-participating royalty owner in executing the oil and
gas lease. This standard is what a “reasonable prudent landowner,” owning
the full mineral fee and not burdened by the outstanding non-participating
royalty interest, would have done under the circumstances. The “utmost fair
dealing” standard has traditionally been viewed as an intermediate standard
between an unduly high fiduciary duty and an insufficiently low duty of
good faith. 99 The “utmost fair dealing” standard is premised on an implied

Ross, New Remedies for Executive Duty Breaches: The Courts Should Throw J.R. Ewing
Out of the Oil Patch, 40 ALA. L. REV. 187, 188 n.3 (1988).
96. For a discussion of the various labels used to describe the duty that the executive
owner owes to the non-executive owner, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2.
Many of the descriptive terms, such as “utmost good faith,” have been used interchangeably
to describe the traditionally prevalent “prudent landowner” standard of the “utmost fair
dealing” duty. 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2.
Differing opinions have been expressed over the years as to what standard of care could
be imposed on the executive to adequately protect the non-executive interest. Suggestions
have included the no duty rule; ordinary care and good faith standard; the utmost fair dealing
standard; and the fiduciary duty. Lloyd Lochridge, Abuse of Executive Rights, 36th Oil &
Gas Inst. § 2.02 (Matthew Bender 1985).
For a criticism of the “utmost fair dealing” duty, and its “prudent landowner” standard,
see Morse and Ross, supra note 95, at 213–28.
97. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
98. The standard which requires the “same degree of diligence and discretion on the part
of the mineral fee holder as would be expected of the average landowner . . .” was taken
from a leading and oft quoted “utmost fair dealing” case, Federal Land Bank v. United
States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958). In that case, the court held, inter alia, that the
unreasonable delay in leasing by the mineral owner which delayed production until after a
term royalty interest had expired violated the “utmost fair dealing” standard. The standard
originates from an eminent law review article in the Texas Law Review, Jones, NonParticipating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 574. For a short historical discussion of the
evolution of the “utmost fair dealing” standard, see Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 213–18.
99. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 9. See also Lochridge, supra note 96; 2 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2, at 210.7.
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covenant in the deed that severs the non-participating royalty interest from
the mineral estate. 100
The standard implicitly recognizes that a mineral owner burdened by a
fraction of non-participating royalty is entitled to pursue his self-interest
when negotiating the bonus, delay rentals, and other advantageous lease
terms. The mineral owner is not obliged to subordinate his interest to the
interest of the non-participating royalty owner. However, the mineral owner
cannot unduly benefit at the expense of the non-participating royalty owner
when exercising the executive right.
The extent to which the mineral owner can act when pursuing his selfinterest at the expense of the non-participating royalty owner is limited by
the “prudent landowner” standard. If the reasonable prudent landowner, not
burdened by the outstanding interest, would have negotiated the same deal
that the mineral owner negotiated, the mineral owner will bear no liability.
However, if the reasonable prudent landowner would have negotiated a deal
more favorable to the royalty owner, the mineral owner may be liable.101
In sum, the “utmost fair dealing” standard examines the fairness of the
lease royalty share to the non-participating royalty owner in relation to the
other lease benefits obtained by the mineral owner. This standard is what an
objective reasonable “prudent landowner” would have bargained for had he
owned the full mineral fee.102
The “utmost fair dealing” standard has been criticized for failing to
provide adequate guidance and predictability in determining whether the
mineral owner, in rejecting or accepting a lease proposal, will violate the
standard. For example, assume that a mineral owner who owns no royalty is
offered two lease proposals. The first is an offer to lease for a $500 per acre
bonus and a 1/8th royalty. The second lease offer is for a $250 per acre
bonus and a 3/16th royalty. The nearest production is one mile away and 30
years ago two dry holes were drilled on the tract. The well logs on the old
dry holes are missing, if they ever existed. Seismic operations have been
conducted in the area but the data is confidential to the proprietor and
unavailable to the mineral owner. What’s an objective “prudent landowner”
owning the full mineral fee to do? How does a lawyer advise the mineral
100. Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
101. For the most common explication of the “prudent landowner” criteria of the “utmost
good faith” standard, see 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 4, § 339.2.
102. Dean Ernest Smith notes, “As usually interpreted, utmost fair dealing requires the
executive right holder to execute the same type of oil and gas lease on the same terms as he
would have done in the absence of an outstanding non-participating interest in a third party.”
Smith III, supra note 93, at 371–72.
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owner who desires to make the right decision, i.e., take the $500 per acre
bonus, but who also wants to avoid the reasonable likelihood of litigation
and, more importantly, the possibility of liability?
A commonly expressed view is that if the lease royalty negotiated by the
executive is equal to the going royalty rate in the area, no violation of the
“utmost fair dealing” standard will likely occur.103 Conversely, a lease
royalty of less than the going rate in the area portends a violation of the
standard. Under these circumstances, the “utmost fair dealing” standard
may reflect reality if all influences on lease terms in the area are equal.
Leases may vary in regard to the primary term offered, the desirability and
the availability of surface damage and non-development clauses or the
proximity to drilling operations or production. Any change in the above
facts may affect the royalty bargained for by an executive rights holder as
to any particular tract. Thus, the royalty share negotiated by landowners in
the area is not dispositive, nor necessarily relevant, to the royalty share for
which the prudent landowner would have bargained. Perhaps, the more
accurate statement of conventional wisdom is a lease royalty that is less
than the going lease royalty rate should foreshadow litigation.
Another criticism of the prudent landowner standard is that it is
inherently inconsistent. The standard permits the executive rights holder to
pursue his self interest. However, in pursuing that self interest, he cannot
benefit himself at the expense of the non-executive. Even though the apparent inconsistency may render the standard difficult to apply, the reason the
standard emphasizes both the mineral owner’s self interest and protection of
the non-executive is simple to explain. The mineral owner owns the right to
the bonus, and like any other rational property owner, he should be free to
secure the maximum return obtainable from his property. However, the
mineral owner also negotiates the lease royalty share for the nonparticipating royalty owner. Thus, some limitation on the mineral owner’s
right to pursue his self-interest to the detriment of the nonparticipating
royalty owner when exercising the executive right is required. The “prudent
landowner” standard or the “utmost fair dealing” standard attempts to
balance the irreconcilable interests of the mineral owner and the nonparticipating royalty owner.
103. Dean Smith argues that the mineral owner should be free without liability under the
prudent landowner standard to trade off a high bonus for a lower royalty, if the royalty is
consistent with leasing practices in the area. Ernest E. Smith, The Standard of Conduct
Owed by Executive Right Holders and Operators to the Owners of Nonparticipating and
Nonoperating Interests, 32nd Oil & Gas Inst., at 241–44 (Matthew Bender 1981)
[hereinafter Smith IV].
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Finally, the standard is viewed by some as being insufficient to protect
the interests of the non-executive owner from the rapacity, or lack of
altruism, of the owner of the executive interest.104 The executive owner
controls the interests of the non-executive and determines their share in the
lease benefits. Therefore, some conclude a more stringent standard of care
than that reflected in the “utmost fair dealing” standard should be imposed
on the executive, regardless of whatever proprietary interest the latter may
also have in the mineral estate.
B. The Fiduciary Duty
In Manges v. Guerra, 105 the Texas Supreme Court held that the owner of
the executive right to a non-participating mineral interest, who also owned a
share of the mineral estate, owed a fiduciary duty106 to the non-executive
interests.
Manges, the executive, violated the fiduciary duty by leasing 107 in excess
of 25,000 acres to himself for a ten year primary term, at a nominal bonus
($5 inclusive), $2 per acre annual delay rentals and a 1/8th royalty. Through
the terms of the lease, Manges acquired the 7/8ths working interest. 108
104. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 229–30.
105. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
106. It is disputed as to whether Manges applied a “fiduciary duty” or the traditional
“utmost fair dealing” standard. The argument for the former is based in part on an initial
opinion issued in the case but subsequently withdrawn by the Texas Supreme Court, Manges
v. Guerra, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. 430 (June 8, 1983) (opinion withdrawn). This initial opinion
contained no language indicating that a fiduciary duty was imposed. However, the
substituted opinion, Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984), contained such
language. For an analysis of the case that favors the fiduciary duty construction, see Smith
III, supra note 93, at 377–78.
107. Manges also acquired other benefits for himself which were not shared with his nonexecutive mineral cotenants. First, Manges mortgaged by deed of trust the executive right to
secure a promissory note for approximately $7 million. Next, in connection with another
loan of $2.8 million (later increased to $5 million), Manges granted an option to purchase
the production from the mineral estate to a third-party. In addition to securing the loans
which benefitted Manges but not his nonexecutive mineral cotenants, both transactions
removed the mineral estate from the leasing market. Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 182.
The mortgagee declared at trial that the mortgage was not effective as to the mineral
interests. The trial court declared the mortgage to be ineffective and nonexistent as to the
executive interest. In addition, the trial court canceled the option to purchase production and
found Manges liable for failing to lease other lands not subject to the Manges to Manges
lease, which he could have leased to a third party but did not. Id. at 183.
108. When Manges executed the lease to himself, the land was being drained by offset
production and the non-participating mineral owners had filed suit with lis pendens. Manges
argued that the suit with lis pendens precluded him from leasing to others. Id. at 182. In
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Shortly thereafter, Manges farmed-out the lease to a third-party, retaining
50% of the working interest cost-free.
The Manges court recognized that the fiduciary duty existing between
the executive and non-executive is specifically based on the relationship of
the parties, not on a covenant implied in the deed. The Manges court
determined that the fiduciary duty required the executive to acquire for the
non-executive every benefit that the executive acquired for himself.
Manges, through his self-dealing, gained “special benefits.” The 7/8ths
working interest from the Manges to Manges lease and the 1/2 cost-free
working interest from the farm-out were not shared with his nonexecutives. Therefore, in addition to actual damages, the court determined
that the non-participating mineral owners also were entitled to cancellation
of the Manges to Manges lease and exemplary damages. 109 However, the
court determined that the non-participating mineral owners’ election to sue
for damages precluded the remedy of cancellation of Manges’ executive
right. 110
The extent to which the holding in Manges elevates the standard of care
owed by the executive to the non-executive in the management of the
mineral estate remains unclear. Typically, a fiduciary duty implies a more
stringent standard than exists under the “utmost fair dealing” standard. The
fiduciary standard implicitly suggests that the executive’s right to pursue
his own self-interest is limited or proscribed.
However, the fiduciary duty in Manges was imposed under
circumstances in which a cotenancy between the executive and nonexecutive interests existed in the mineral estate. Manges owned an
undivided 1/2 mineral estate and the executive right to the 1/2 nonparticipating mineral estate. The fiduciary duty required the executive to
acquire for the non-executive every benefit that he exacted for himself. By
procuring benefits that profit only the executive interest, the executive

addition to the farm-out, discussed in the text of this article, Manges also granted a “top
lease” to the third-party that was to be effective if the Manges to Manges lease was judicially
canceled. Id. at 183.
109. The non-participating mineral owners recovered the following from Manges for his
breach of the fiduciary obligation: their proportionate share as cotenants of the net profits
from the wells drilled on the canceled Manges-Manges lease; actual damages of
$382,608.79; and exemplary damages of $500,000. Id. at 183, 184–85.
110. The non-participating mineral owner’s basis for canceling the executive right in
Manges was “fraudulent inducement” to convey the executive right to Manges in the deed of
severance. The trial court found that the non-participating mineral owners had been
fraudulently induced to convey their executive interests. Id. at 184.
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incurs liability. Concomitantly, the pursuit of self-interest by the executive
at the expense of the non-executive is actionable.
A fiduciary duty requiring participation on a proportionate ownership
basis in all of the lease benefits is appropriate when the executive and nonexecutive interests share a cotenancy relationship in the mineral estate.
When a cotenancy exists, there is no necessity to recognize or protect the
pursuit of self-interest that results in a division of lease benefits unrelated to
the proportional ownership interests.
When a mineral owner burdened by a fraction of nonparticipating royalty
interest exercises the executive right, both parties do not share on a
proportional ownership basis. The relationship is unlike the cotenancy
relationship in Manges. The mineral owner is entitled to the bonus, delay
rental payments, and only a partial share, if any, of the lease royalty. The
non-participating royalty owner participates only in his share of lease
royalty. Thus, the mandate of the fiduciary duty in Manges, the acquisition
of identical benefits for the non-executive when the executive negotiates the
lease, cannot be applied when the non-executive is a non-participating
royalty owner.
That does not mean, however, that the Manges decision has not raised
the standard of care that the mineral owner owes to the non-participating
royalty owner. There has been speculation about the exact standard the
fiduciary duty imposes on the mineral owner who exercises the executive
right in regard to the non-participating royalty interest. One view is that the
fiduciary duty prohibits the executive from “acting against the nonexecutive’s interest” and requires the executive to “act affirmatively to
protect the non-executive’s interest.” 111 Another view is that the executive’s
role is analogous to the role of a “trustee” who is also the “life beneficiary”
of the trust, “who can take his own interest into account in making
decisions when administering the trust . . . but cannot take unfair
advantage . . . by making decisions that . . . substantially disadvantage or
effectively destroy the remainder interest.” 112 Under the latter view, the
executive would be entitled to take his own interest into account and
consider the right to bonus and delay rentals, so long as his decisions were
in good faith and did not substantially disadvantage the royalty owner. 113
111. Morse & Ross, supra note 95, at 232.
112. Smith III, supra note 93, at 387–88.
113. Smith III, supra note 93, at 387–88. Smith also suggests that the executive under
this standard should be able to trade a large royalty (1/6th) and a small bonus for a large
bonus and small royalty (1/8th) so long as the small royalty is consistent with current leasing
practices in the area.
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Hopefully, if the Manges decision elevated the standard of care that the
mineral owner owes when exercising the executive right in regard to the
fraction of non-participating royalty interests, the new standard will not
unduly limit or proscribe the mineral owner’s self-interest when negotiating
the lease bonus, delay rentals, and other lease benefits like surface damages.
Requiring the mineral owner to subordinate his interest in a reasonable
bonus or surface damage protection will diminish his property interest and
violate the intent of the parties to the deed of severance. 114
Despite the uncertainty that lingers as to the Manges decision’s effect on
the standard of care, no one doubts that the case has obviously expanded the
remedies available to the non-executive, including the non-participating
royalty owner. The remedies are now premised on a breach of the fiduciary
duty, as opposed to a breach of the implied contract of the “utmost fair
dealing” standard. Remedies familiar under the law of fiduciaries such as
exemplary damages, cancellation of either the lease, the executive right, or
both; and the imposition of a resulting or constructive trust are now
potentially recoverable by the nonexecutive.115
However, the Texas Civil Appellate Courts have not construed the
Manges decision as dictating a wholesale abandoning of the “utmost fair
dealing” standard with its prudent landowner test. Emphasizing that
Manges involved cotenants to a mineral interest where the executive owner
had determined by lease the share of royalty, bonus, and delay rentals
received by the non-participating mineral owners, the appellate courts have
limited the fiduciary duty imposed by Manges to instances in which the
executive “controls” the amount of lease benefits received by a nonexecutive owner.116 Thus, the fiduciary duty of Manges is imposed on a
114. Mack Keith McCollum, Manges v. Guerra: The Executive Right Holder Undergoes
Close Scrutiny, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 189, 203 (1986).
115. For a complete description of the potential remedies, see Morse & Ross, supra note
95, at 231.
116. The distinction that “control” over the lease benefits is determinative as to whether
the fiduciary standard of Manges is applicable appears well-entrenched in the Texas Civil
Appellate Courts. For example, in Dearing, Inc. v. Spiller, 824 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992), the fiduciary standard was applied to a non-participating mineral interest. Mims v.
Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), involved the applicability of the fiduciary
standard to a fraction of non-participating royalty interest. Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256,
263-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rejected the applicability of the fiduciary duty to a fractional
share royalty interest and applied the “utmost good faith” prudent landowner standard.
Finally, Comanche Land & Cattle Co. v. Adams, 688 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985),
applied the fiduciary duty standard to a fraction of defeasible term non-participating royalty
interest.
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mineral owner with the executive right to a fraction of non-participating
royalty. 117 The imposition of this duty mandates, at least, 118 that the owner
of the latter interest receive their proportionate share of whatever royalty
the executive obtains in the lease negotiation. Conversely, the fractional
share royalty interest which is entitled to its fixed fractional share
regardless of the size of the lease royalty, is protected by the “utmost fair
dealing” standard of the prudent landowner test. 119
Mims v. Beal 120 is an illustrative case. In that case, the plaintiffs owned a
1
/4th of non-participating royalties with John Mims and his wife, Chattie,
owning the executive right. The Mimses executed an oil and gas lease to
their son, Angus Mims, that provided for no bonus and a 1/8th royalty. Five
months later, Angus Mims assigned the lease to a third-party in return for a
1
/16th overriding royalty. Plaintiffs, contending that the 1/8th royalty in the
Angus Mims lease was unreasonably low, sued John and Chattie Mims and
Angus Mims for damages occasioned by breach of the duty owed by the
executive to the non-executive in the Mims to Mims lease. Finding that the
“duty of good faith and fair dealing” was breached, the trial court awarded
actual damages against the Mimses. Also, for “participating in the breach,”
the court assessed actual damages against Angus Mims. A constructive trust
was imposed on the nonparticipating royalty owner’s share of the
overriding interest in the third-party lease. Further, finding that both parties
acted in an “unconscionable, willful, and wanton manner and in total
disregard of the plaintiffs’ rights,” exemplary damages of $2500 were
assessed against the Mimses and $5000 against Angus Mims.
On appeal, both defendants argued that no fiduciary relationship existed
between the Mimses and the plaintiffs. The court rejected the defendants’
argument and held that the fiduciary standard of Manges applied because
the exercise of the executive right “controlled” the amount of royalty that
the fraction of non-participating royalty interest receives under the lease.
The executive violated the fiduciary obligation in several respects by
executing the Mims to Mims lease. For example, the executive engaged in
“self dealing” which included parents dealing with a son and a failure to
negotiate at arms length for current market terms. Moreover, as a
consequence of the self-dealing, the son’s overriding royalty interest
reserved in the third-party lease was treated as if it were owned by the
117. See Mims, 810 S.W.2d at 876; Comanche Land and Cattle Co., 688 S.W.2d at 914.
118. The question remains unanswered as to whether the fiduciary standard of Manges
requires the executive to exact for the non-executive the highest royalty obtainable.
119. Pickens, 764 S.W.2d at 263.
120. 810 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
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parents. This resulted in the executives having exacted a royalty share for
themselves which was not shared with the non-participating royalty owner.
Therefore, on appeal, the court affirmed the award of actual and exemplary
damages against the executives, the Mimses, as well as the imposition of
the constructive trust on the overriding interest.
VI. The Lessee’s Liability For Inducing Or Participating In The Breach Of
The Standard Of Care
Mims v. Beall illustrates the potential for a lessee to incur liability in the
leasing transaction in which the mineral owner with the executive right
violates the requisite standard of care owed to the non-executive interest.
Angus Mims, the son, was the lessee to the lease in which the executives,
his parents, violated the fiduciary duty to the nonparticipating royalty
owners. As the lessee, Angus Mims did not owe a fiduciary duty to the nonparticipating royalty owners. However, the court determined that as the
lessee, Angus Mims was liable to the non-executive interest for “knowingly
participating” in the breach of the executive duty. Thus, the court affirmed
the award of actual and exemplary damages against the lessee. Further, the
court determined that an executive who breaches the standard of care owed
to the non-executive and the lessee who induces or participates in that
breach are jointly and severally liable.
The general rule of liability for the lessee who takes a lease from an
executive subject to a non-executive interest was stated in Mims v. Beall:
So long as the lessee maintains an arm’s length position in the
transaction, he does not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of utmost
good faith to the owner of the non-executive interest. If,
however, the lessee agrees with the executive to an arrangement
made for the purpose of excluding or minimizing the benefits of
an outstanding or non-participating interest owner, the lessee can
be held liable to the injured third party.121
Thus, if the lessee either “induces” the executive to breach the standard
of care or “knowingly participates” in the breach, for example, by agreeing
to an arrangement with the executive for the express purpose of lessening
the non-executive’s lease benefits, the lessee is liable to the non-executive
interest. “Induce” clearly encompasses “planting the seed in the mind” of
the executive that the two should cut a deal that breaches the duty.
However, the mere offer of a lower than prevailing royalty and a higher
than customary bonus by the lessee as a special incentive for the executive
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to grant the lease may well constitute “inducement” and cause the lessee to
incur liability. Furthermore, the lessee also cannot “knowingly participate”
in the executive’s perpetration of the breach of duty owed to the nonexecutive. The lessee cannot agree with the executive to a royalty share that
has the express purpose of excluding or lessening the non-participating
royalty owner’s royalty share.
More importantly, the court indicated that the lessee may also be liable if
he should reasonably have been aware that the executive was acting in
breach of his duty. As to this basis of liability, the court further noted that
the fact that the non-participating royalty deed is recorded puts the lessee on
constructive notice of the existence of the nonparticipating royalty owner.
An important lesson of Mims v. Beall is that the lessee can avoid liability
while negotiating a lease from a mineral owner burdened by a nonparticipating royalty interest. A fundamental premise of the decision is that
the lessee does not owe a fiduciary duty or a duty of utmost fair dealing to
the non-participating royalty owner. So long as the lessee maintains the
negotiations with the executive owner at arms length and secures a lease
from the executive that is competitive with current market conditions,
including the royalty prevailing in the area, the lessee should be able to
avoid liability.
However, what is unsettling about Mims v. Beall is the court’s dicta that
indicates the lessee may be liable if he should have reasonably been aware
that the executive was acting in breach of the executive’s duty to the nonparticipating royalty owner. Thus, if a lease is taken on the basis of a
superficial title search which does not determine the existence and extent of
non-participating royalty interests but only focuses on the ownership of the
executive right, the lessee may be found liable to the non-participating royalty owner for agreeing to lease terms that involve unusually low royalty or
an overriding royalty interest that is structured as bonus.
VII. Conclusion
Non-participating royalty interests should incite caution in both the
lawyer and the landman. There is an important difference between a
fraction of and a fractional share royalty interest. Care must be taken when
construing royalty deeds to determine if a fraction of or a fractional share
royalty has been conveyed. Older royalty conveyances have created a
wealth of interpretation problems and an array of inconsistent, often
puzzling case law. Finally, courts are construing more stringently the
substantive content of the duty that a mineral owner owes to the fraction of
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non-participating royalty owner when negotiating the oil and gas lease and
are awarding more drastic remedies for breach of this duty. Even though the
lessee owes no duty to the non-participating royalty owner in the lease
negotiations, to avoid the imposition of liability including the possibility of
punitive damages and lease cancellation, the lessee must exercise care to
avoid “inducing” or “knowingly participating” in the executive’s breach, or
being caught in a situation where the lessee “should have known that he
was participating” in the executive’s breach.
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